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Special thanks go to André Meier, who has continually supported me as a friend, mentor and
role-model.
This thesis would not exist without the encouragement of my parents, Eva and Christian.
They instilled in me a scientific mindset and at the same time taught me to believe in the wonders
of our world. I am grateful to my sister, Anna, who has always provided me with helpful advice,
as well as her partner, Christian, who supported me during my first ever economic research
project at the University of St. Gallen.
Most of all, I am indebted to my fiancée, Sofina, who has been there unconditionally from




This collection of essays examines the topic of macroeconomic stabilisation in an international
context, focusing on monetary policy, capital controls and exchange rates.
Chapter 1, written in collaboration with Giancarlo Corsetti and João Duarte, reconsiders the
effects of common monetary policy shocks across countries in the euro area, using a data-rich
factor model and identifying shocks with high-frequency surprises around policy announcements.
We show that the degree of heterogeneity in the response to shocks, while being low in finan-
cial variables and output, is significant in consumption, consumer prices and macro variables
related to the labour and housing markets. Mirroring country-specific institutional and market
differences, we find that home ownership rates are significantly correlated with the strength of
the housing channel in monetary policy transmission. We document a high dispersion in the
response to shocks of house prices and rents and show that, similar to responses in the US, these
variables tend to move in different directions.
In Chapter 2, I build a two-country, two-good model to examine the welfare effects of capital
controls, finding that under certain circumstances, a shut-down in asset trade can be a Pareto
improvement. Further, I examine the robustness of the result to parameter changes, explore a
wider set of policy instruments and confront computational issues in this class of international
macroeconomic models. I document that within an empirically relevant parameter span for the
trade elasticity, the gains from capital controls might be significantly larger than suggested by
previous contributions. Moreover, I establish that a refined form of capital controls in the shape
of taxes and tariffs cannot improve upon the outcome under financial autarky. Finally, results
show that the conjunction of pruning methods and endogenous discount factors can remove
explosive behaviour from this class of models and restore equilibrating properties.
In Chapter 3, I use a panel of 20 emerging market currencies to assess whether a model that
combines fundamental and non-fundamental exchange rate forecasting approaches can success-
fully predict risk premia (i.e. currency excess returns) over the short horizon. In doing so, I
aim to overcome three main shortcomings of earlier research: i) Sensitivity to the chosen sam-
ple period; ii) seemingly arbitrary selection of explanatory variables that differs from currency
to currency; and iii) difficulty in interpreting forecasts beyond the numerical signal. Based on
a theoretical model of currency risk premia, I use real exchange rate strength combined with
indicators for carry, momentum and economic sentiment to homogeneously forecast risk premia
across all 20 currencies in the sample at a monthly frequency. In doing so, the model remains
largely agnostic about structural choices, keeping arbitrarily imposed restrictions to a minimum.
Results from portfolio construction suggest that returns are significant and robust both across
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Chapter 1
One Money, Many Markets: A
Factor Model Approach to Monetary
Policy in the Euro Area with
High-Frequency Identification
This chapter is co-authored with Giancarlo Corsetti and João Duarte.
1.1 Introduction
Monetary policy in the euro area has long been challenged by financial, economic and institu-
tional heterogeneity among member countries. Although over time there has been some conver-
gence in financial markets, the convergence process has slowed down markedly since the financial
crisis (see ECB, 2017). Other markets have remained remarkably different across member coun-
tries. Most notably, the institutional backgrounds in labour and housing are highly dissimilar
across the currency block.
Two longstanding questions are to which extent these differences in institutional backgrounds
imply a heterogeneous transmission of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) common monetary
policy and, in particular, which specific institutional characteristics drive the observed hetero-
geneity. These questions are of first-order importance from a policy perspective.1 Naturally,
the ECB would benefit from knowing how national policies and reforms of the institutional
framework in a particular economy affect monetary transmission. At the same time, national
policy makers would gain from understanding the implications of their policies and reforms for
the transmission of monetary policy.
1The early policy and empirical debate on this issue is summarized by Angeloni et al. (2003), see also Berben
et al. (2004).
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In this paper, we investigate heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy across the
euro area (EA) using a dynamic factor model (DFM), and take a first step towards relating the
observed heterogeneity to cross-border differences in institutions and markets. We assemble a
large dataset including economic and financial time series for the EA as a block and for the
11 original member countries, spanning the years from 1999 to 2016. The high dimensionality
of the data allows us to carry out a formal comparison of the degree of heterogeneity among
responses to monetary policy shocks across different dimensions of the economy, such as output
and asset prices, as well as housing and labour markets. To identify monetary policy shocks, we
construct an external instrument using high-frequency changes in asset prices around ECB policy
announcements, following the contributions by Gurkaynak et al. (2005) and Gertler and Karadi
(2015). Comparing country-specific institutional characteristics in national housing markets as
a case study, we show that these characteristics are strongly correlated to the strength of the
housing channel in monetary policy transmission.
Our main results are as follows. First, at the aggregate EA level, we find that the factor
model results are in line with theory and, notably, that the transmission of monetary shocks does
not suffer from the price puzzle. Second, we show that the estimated country-level effects are
significantly heterogeneous in prices and variables related to labour and housing markets—some
of the least integrated markets in the euro area. The degree of heterogeneity among responses to
policy is instead low in financial variables and output. Third, we use our comparative analysis
of European housing markets to show that the strength of the housing channel is correlated
with differences in home ownership rates, which, as we argue, reflect different institutional
characteristics across euro area countries.
On methodological ground, the paper’s main contribution lies in the construction of the
external instrument series, which we base on changes in the 1-year Euro Overnight Index Average
(EONIA) swap rate (i.e. the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate for the euro area) around policy
announcements. In doing so, we overcome major data availability issues by combining intraday
data with end-of-day data from different timezones, creating de-facto intraday series where
actual intraday data is unavailable.2 This solution for the construction of our instrument is not
only mechanically feasible, but also economically meaningful, as it highlights the implications
of using various means of policy communication—press releases, press statements and Q&A
sessions—for the transmission of current and expected future policy. The approach helps us to
create a broad measure of monetary policy surprises that incorporates all of the communication
channels above. Finally, we test for the relevance of the series in a small VAR, confirming its
2Intraday data on EONIA swaps is only available for recent years. However, we were able to combine end-
of-day data from Tokyo and London to create a de-facto intraday series that goes back to the introduction of
the euro. We then compared a narrowly constructed instrument over a sub-sample for which we had complete
intraday data with our proposed de-facto intraday series. We find that the series are not significantly different
for the sub-sample. See Section 1.2.3 for details.
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validity as an external instrument. At the time of writing and to the best of our knowledge,
there are very few attempts to construct an external instrument for EA monetary policy.3 A
notable exception is Jarocinski and Karadi (2018). In contemporaneous work, these authors use
the high-frequency co-movement of interest rates and stock prices around a narrow window of
the policy announcement to disentangle policy from information shocks. Notably, the effects
of the monetary shocks we identify in this paper are close to the effects of policy shocks (as
opposed to information shocks) documented by these authors.
Our second contribution is motivated by the need to test heterogeneity in the responses of
economic variables to a common shock. For each set of impulse responses (e.g. GDP across
member countries), we calculate the coefficient of variation statistic, also known as relative
standard deviation. The coefficient of variation for a variable is defined as the standard deviation
of responses across countries with respect to the EA response, normalised by the size of the EA
response. This yields a statistical measure of the dispersion of impulse responses which allows
us to carry out comparisons across variables. We employ a bootstrapping procedure to obtain
error bands for the coefficient of variation of each variable as well as pairwise differences across
variables.
In specifying our empirical model, we build on two strands of the literature. The first is fac-
tor modelling, which has emerged as early as the 1970s4 and was more recently popularised for
monetary policy analysis by Bernanke et al. (2005). These authors model macroeconomic inter-
action with a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) that combines factors and perfectly observable
series, typically interest rates, in one dynamic system. As a special case of FAVARs, dynamic
factor models (DFMs) only contain unobservable factors. Among other applications of DFMs,
Stock and Watson (2012) use this approach to disentangle the channels of the 2007-09 recession.
From an applied perspective, the prime advantage of a factor approach5 is its ability to keep
track of individual country-level responses to a common monetary policy shock without heavy
parameterisation. Looking at the alternatives, country-by-country VARs incur the cost of heavy
parameterisation, while a large panel VAR (PVAR) with all countries imposes restrictions on
the individual dynamics. The dynamic factor model solves both problems and provides dynamic
effects on the individual countries—including net spillovers—while keeping the parameter space
small. In addition, the assumptions on the information structure in the dynamic factor model
naturally fit the EA setting. The ECB follows not only a large number of euro-wide series but
3Limitations on the availability of data are a strict constraint to construct this instrument for the euro area.
Some work, such as Kim and Other (2017), resorts to daily data. However, as the resulting windows around policy
announcements become very large, they are more likely contaminated by shocks other than those stemming from
monetary policy. Notably, European data is frequently released on the morning of a policy meeting, leading to a
systematic disturbance of instruments that rely on daily data.
4see Stock and Watson (2016) for a comprehensive exposition of factor models, including their early history.
5see e.g. Giannone et al. (2005), Bernanke et al. (2005), Stock and Watson (2005) and Forni and Gambetti
(2010).
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also series in individual member countries. Hence, an empirical model with a small number of
variables that does not include country-level data is unlikely to span the information set used
by the ECB.6
While we closely follow the methodology of Stock and Watson (2012) when we construct our
DFM, we bridge the approach with developments from the literature on high-frequency identifi-
cation and external instruments. As is well known, estimations of monetary policy transmission
suffer from an identification problem. One common way to overcome this problem and identify
monetary policy shocks is to impose additional internal structure on the VAR, such as timing
or sign restrictions. Alternatively, one can add information from outside of the VAR, termed an
external instrument approach. We make use of the latter. The two leading examples of existing
external instruments for monetary policy shocks in the US are the Romer and Romer (2002)
instrument based on a narrative approach, and the high-frequency approach by Gurkaynak et al.
(2005). For the second, the key idea is that by choosing a narrow time window around policy
announcements, any surprises occurring within the window are most likely only associated with
monetary policy shocks. The idea to use high-frequency changes in asset prices, specifically inter-
est rate derivatives, has also been developed by Kuttner (2001), Hamilton (2008) and Campbell
et al. (2012).7 Building on these contributions, Gertler and Karadi (2015) identify monetary
policy shocks in a VAR using high frequency changes in Fed funds futures. This paper builds
a hybrid between the high-frequency identification proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2015) and
the dynamic factor model of Stock and Watson (2012).
The analysis of the housing channel conducted in our paper is related to Calza et al. (2013),
who studied how heterogeneity in the structure of housing finance across member countries in
the euro area can affect the transmission of monetary policy to house prices. Differently from
their work, we take a more comprehensive approach and, specifically, document how differences
in home ownership rates are closely linked to asymmetries in house price responses. Moreover,
we investigate the role of rents in the housing channel and show that together with house prices,
they have a strong link to responses in consumption. More generally, our work is related to the
large body of policy and academic research that, given the importance of the topic, has been
devoted to the heterogeneous transmission of monetary policy across EA member states. Among
the leading examples are Ciccarelli et al. (2013), who look at heterogeneity from the perspective
of financial fragility, as well as Barigozzi et al. (2014) who, similar to the methodology followed in
this paper, rely on a factor model, although identifying shocks with sign restrictions and pursuing
a less comprehensive study, both in the number of variables included and the methodological
6Other seminal contributions on dynamic factor modelling include Sargent and Sims (1977), Sargent (1989),
Giannone et al. (2005) and Boivin and Giannoni (2007).
7Further applications of high-frequency identification in the context of monetary policy can be found in Hanson
and Stein (2015), Nakamura and Steinsson (2013), Bagliano and Favero (1999), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002),
Faust et al. (2004) and Barakchian and Crowe (2013), among others.
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and empirical questions addressed.
In the next section, we describe the methodology used in the empirical analysis and provide
details on the external instrument used for the identification of monetary policy shocks. In
Section 1.3, we present our results, tracing out the effects of monetary policy on the EA as a
whole, as well as on individual member countries. Section 1.4 uses the housing market as a case
study to uncover how institutional differences are affecting the monetary transmission across
the euro area. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 A Dynamic Factor Model for the Euro Area
We begin by motivating the use of a dynamic factor model for the EA and laying out the
empirical framework. Later in this section we provide details about the external instrument we
construct to identify monetary policy shocks. At the end of the section, we discuss the large
data set and estimation.
1.2.1 Motivation
Given the EA setting, we are fundamentally interested in studying the effects of a common
monetary policy shock on the EA as a block and on its individual member countries.8 Recovering
both the effects on the block and on member countries imposes some empirical challenges and
trade-offs. On the one hand, fully recovering the effects of monetary policy on each individual
member country comes with heavy parameterisation. On the other hand, reducing the parameter
space by imposing restrictions prevents us from studying the full width of heterogeneous effects.
In addition, a small data sample in the time dimension, as encountered in the context of the
EA, further increases the acuteness and relevance of this trade-off.
We propose a dynamic factor model for the EA as a parsimonious way to avoid heavy
parameterisation while keeping track of individual country responses to the common monetary
policy shock. The dynamic factor model allows us to capture dynamic effects on individual
countries through unobservable common components. The dimensionality reduction achieved
through the factor model allows us to get statistically robust dynamic effects on the individual
countries while keeping the parameter space small.
The dynamic factor model has another set of appealing features for the EA. Firstly, we
can relax the informational assumption that both the ECB and the econometrician perfectly
observe all relevant economic variables. Secondly, as the ECB monitors a large number of
indicators in the process of policy formulation, including on country level, it is necessary for the
econometrician to take account of the same information set. The DFM achieves this. Finally,
8A similar setting would appear if one was simultaneously interested in the effects of monetary policy on the
U.S. as a whole and at the individual State level.
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the dynamic factor model provides a format that is consistent with economic theory. We next
address each of these points.
In using a dynamic factor model we do not have to take a stand on specific observable
measures corresponding to theoretical concepts. This point was convincingly put forward by
Bernanke et al. (2005). In the EA context, this relaxation becomes more relevant as it is harder
to find observable Eurowide variables—often weighted averages of individual member countries—
that correspond to concepts of economic theory. For example, the concept of economic activity
in the EA may not be perfectly measured by taking a weighted average of real GDP across
countries, given compositional changes that cannot be captured by treating the EA as a single
economy in a theoretical model.
The European Central Bank follows not only a large number of eurowide series but also a
large number of individual member countries’ series. Hence, an empirical model with a small
number of variables that does not include country data is unlikely to span the information set
used by the ECB. This naturally motivates the inclusion of country-level series in our analysis.
The state-space representation of the dynamic factor model also provides a clear link with
economic theory, which creates the opportunity to formally test different mechanisms aimed at
explaining the dynamic effects found in this paper. Moreover, given the large size of dynamic
effects found in observables, it is possible to test interactions of different mechanisms using the
same model and dataset.
There are alternatives to the DFM approach chosen by us—notably Panel VAR and Global
VAR models. Both of these approaches involve restricting or explicitly modelling the dynamics
through which variables in different units affect each other. These restrictions come at a cost of
higher parameterisation relative to the dynamic factor model. Given that we are not explicitly
interested in these interaction at the cross-sectional level, but rather in the final net effect, we
choose the dynamic factor model for efficiency gains. Ciccarelli et al. (2013) provide a further
insightful discussion of the differences between these three approaches.
1.2.2 Empirical Framework
We consequently use the DFM to model macroeconomic interaction. In doing so, we largely
follow the methodology proposed by Stock and Watson (2012).
Given a vector of n macroeconomic series Xt = (X1t, ..., Xnt)
′ we first model each series as a
combination of factors and idiosyncratic disturbances:
Xt = ΛFt + et, (1.1)
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where Ft is a vector of unobserved factors, Λ is an n × r matrix of factor loadings and et =
(e1t, ..., ent)
′ denotes a vector of n disturbances. We can interpret ΛFt as the ‘common compo-
nent’ of Xt, whilst et is the ‘idiosyncratic component’. The evolution of factors is characterised
by the following VAR:
Ft = Φ1Ft−1 + Φ2Ft−2 + ...+ ΦsFt−s + ηt, (1.2)
which can be rewritten with lag-operator notation as
Φ(L)Ft = ηt, (1.3)
where Φ(L) is a p× r matrix of lag polynomials and ηt a vector of r innovations. This equation
characterises all dynamics in the model. As it stems solely from the interaction of factors,
there is no need to model the co-movement of observed variables, hence avoiding the curse of
dimensionality.
The static factors can be estimated by suitable cross-sectional averaging. Whilst a setup with
multiple factors and general factor loadings does not allow for simple cross-sectional averaging
to produce a consistent estimate of the factors, the idea can be generalised using principal
components analysis. Given large n and T , the principal components approach estimates the
space spanned by the factors, even though the factors themselves are not estimated consistently.
Put differently, Ft is estimated consistently up to premultiplication by an arbitrary nonsingular
r × r matrix. The resulting normalisation problem can be resolved by imposing the restriction
that Λ′Λ = Ir. Given that this restriction is chosen arbitrarily, the factors cannot be directly
interpreted in an economic sense. For most parts, we will work with the reduced-form DFM,
making the normalisation inconsequential.
More generally, principal component analysis provides the factors that explain the most
variation in the data, while at the same time avoiding an information overlap between the
factors as they are orthogonal to each other.
1.2.3 Identification
This section turns to the identification of the monetary policy shocks in the DFM. As is well
known, estimations of monetary policy suffer from an identification problem, as monetary policy
contemporaneously reacts to other variables in the model. To find the part of the variation in
monetary policy that is orthogonal to other variables, various approaches have been proposed
in the literature. In traditional VAR-type models, researchers have typically imposed some
internal structure on the coefficients in the VAR, such as timing restrictions or sign restrictions.
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More recently, Montiel Olea et al. (2012) as well as others have proposed an additional method,
where information from outside the VAR is used to identify monetary policy. In the so-called
external instrument approach, an instrument is employed that is correlated with the structural
shock that the researcher tries to uncover, while being uncorrelated with all other shocks in
the system. This corresponds to the standard assumptions of relevance and exogeneity in the
instrumental variables literature.
The main concept behind using an external instrument is that when regressing the VAR
innovations ηt on the instrument Zt, the fitted value of the regression identifies the structural
shock—up to sign and scale. In fact, as this approach uncovers the covariance between ηt and
Zt, a regression of the instrument on the VAR innovations would equally uncover the structural
shock.
Following the VAR literature and the notation in Stock and Watson (2012), we model a
linear relationship between the VAR innovations ηt and the structural shocks εt:






where H is a matrix of coefficients and H1 is the first column of H. It follows that Σηη = HΣεεH
′,
with Σηη = E(ηtη
′
t) and Σεε = E(εtε
′
t). If the system is invertible—a standard assumption in
the VAR literature—structural shocks can be expressed as linear combinations of innovations:
εt = H
−1ηt. (1.5)
The main interest in the DFM, as in other VAR-type models, lies in uncovering impulse
response functions (IRFs) to a specific shock. To find the impulse response function of Xt with
respect to the ith structural shock, we can use equations 1.3 and 1.5 to get
Ft = Φ(L)
−1Hεt. (1.6)
Substituting 1.6 into 1.1, we find that
Xt = ΛΦ(L)
−1Hεt + et. (1.7)
where the IRF is ΛΦ(L)−1H. Λ and Φ(L) are already identified from the reduced form, equation
1.2, which we can estimate via ordinary least squares. However, this leaves the identification of
Ht, which is dealt with in the next section.
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As mentioned above, we identify the shock of interest, say ε1t, using the instrumental variable
Zt. The necessary conditions are:
1. Relevance: E(ε1tZt) = α 6= 0
2. Exogeneity: E(εjtZt) = 0, j = 2, ..., r
3. Uncorrelated shocks: Σεε = D = diag(σ
2
ε1 , ..., σ
2
εr),
where D is an r× r matrix. The last condition is the standard structural VAR assumption that
structural shocks are uncorrelated. This assumption does not fix the variance of shocks. From
equation 1.4 we get





 = H1α, (1.8)
where the last identity follows from the relevance and exogeneity conditions. It follows that
H1 is identified up to scale and sign by the covariance between the VAR innovations and the
instrument. To identify the shocks themselves, we need the third condition on uncorrelated
shocks. It implies that we can rewrite the varianance-covariance matrix of ηt as
Σηη = HΣεεH
′ = HDH ′. (1.9)
Moreover, defining by Π the matrix of coefficients from the population regression of Zt on ηt,















By simplifying and using equation 1.5, we obtain
αH ′1(HDH
′)−1ηt = α(H ′1(H
′)−1)D−1εt. (1.12)
Finally, we note that H−1H1 = e1, where e1 = (1, 0, ..., 0)′, which implies that
α(H ′1(H
′)−1)D−1εt = (α/σ2ε1)ε1t = Πηt. (1.13)
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This conforms with the original statement that the fitted value of a regression of the instrument
on the innovations, i.e. Πηt, identifies the structural shock ε1t up to a constant. For additional
intuition, Stock and Watson (2012) point out that if the structural shocks εt were observable
and we could hence regress the instrument on the structural shocks, the predicted value would
again uncover the shock ε1t, up to scale, as the coefficients on all other elements of εt would be
zero. This follows from the relevance and exogeneity conditions of the instrument. Equation
1.13 shows that the projection of Zt on ηt provides the exact same result, uncovering ε1t. Note
that to estimate the structural shock, we use the sample analogue of the above equation.
Instrument - “Scripta Volant, Verba Manent”9
To obtain an instrument that fulfills the necessary requirement of only being correlated with
the monetary policy shock, we build a new series of high frequency surprises around ECB policy
announcements. A similar approach has previously been proposed for US monetary policy
by Gertler and Karadi (2015). The key idea is that by choosing a narrow time window around
policy announcements, any surprises occurring within the window are most likely only associated
with monetary policy shocks. Put differently, the assumption is that no other major structural
shocks occur during the chosen window around the policy announcement. Correspondingly, all
endogenous monetary policy, i.e. all expected monetary policy, is assumed to already have been
priced in before the window starts. Consequently, endogenous monetary policy would not cause
a change in the instrument at the time of the announcement.
For the instrument we choose changes in the 1-year Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA)
swap rate. The logic goes that while expectations about future policy rate changes are already
priced in, unexpected policy shocks will cause the swap to appreciate or depreciate instantly.
If market participants, for example, expect a hike in the policy rate by a certain amount, the
announcement of such a hike will not cause the 1-year EONIA swap rate to move. However,
should a hike or cut be out of line with expectations, the swap rate will adjust as soon as the
announcement is made. Similarly, any policy action that changes expectations about future
rate movements—often termed ‘forward guidance’—will have an impact on the swap. Lloyd
(2017a) and Lloyd (2017b) demonstrates that 1 to 24-month Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS)
rates accurately measure interest rate expectations. As our chosen EONIA swap rate is the
corresponding OIS rate for the euro area, this finding is directly applicable to our instrument,
allowing us to capture not only current monetary policy, but also expectations about the future
path of monetary policy.
9The original quotation (Verba volant, scripta manent), attributed to Caius Titus, roughly translates as
“spoken words fly away, written words remain.” We find that, on the contrary, it is often the spoken word of
the ECB President during the press conference and Q&A session, which has a larger impact on markets than the
written word of the monetary policy press release.
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When deciding on the tenor of the EONIA swap, two considerations have to be taken into
account. Firstly, to capture how a monetary policy shock affects interest rates across the whole
yield curve, a longer dated swap is better suited compared to one with a shorter tenor. On the
other hand, however, term premia play a larger role at longer horizons, potentially contaminat-
ing the information about future short rates. In dealing with this trade-off, we choose the 1-year
rate, based on the observation that 1-year rates are highly sensitive to monetary policy, while
still remaining relatively unaffected by term premia. That said, we also construct instruments
based on 3-month, 6-month and 2-year EONIA swaps and do not find a significant difference in
our results.
For their high frequency analysis of US monetary policy, Gertler and Karadi (2015) choose a
window of 30 minutes around the policy announcement (starting 10 minutes before the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement and ending 20 minutes after). The main
policy announcement of the FOMC contains a large amount of information about the decision
as well as the view of the committee about the state of the economy and expectations of future
policy action. This means that within the 30 minute window, the market can fully integrate
recent policy changes and adjust the price of the instrument. The procedure of policy releases
is somewhat different at the ECB. The release of the monetary policy decision at 13:45 CET
only contains a limited amount of information on the latest policy actions. A significant amount
of information is disseminated to the market at a later stage, through the press conference
and Q&A with the President, starting at 14:30 CET. For this reason, we decided to extend
the window for our analysis to cover not only the prime release, but also the press conference.
Specifically, we choose a 6-hour window from 13:00 to 19:00 CET.10
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show examples of characteristic movements in the 1-year EONIA swap on
ECB meeting days, highlighting the importance of including the Q&A in the high-frequency win-
dow. On 5 June 2008, the Governing Council of the ECB decided that policy rates will remain
unchanged. As this was in line with market expectations, the 1-year EONIA swap rate did not
move much in reaction to the press release at 13:45 CET. During the press conference however,
the president expressed concern about increased risks to price stability, setting expectations of
rate hikes in the near future. In reaction to this information, the swap rate immediately jumped
higher and over the afternoon increased by 27 basis points. This example clearly demonstrates
10The press conference typically lasts for only one hour, implying that the window could be more narrowly
defined, ending, e.g. at 16:00 CET. We chose not to do so due to data availability issues. Specifically, intraday
data on swap prices on Bloomberg are available only from January 2008 onwards. In other words, we would have
been able to create an instrument only from 2008 using intraday data. For a window from 13:00 to 19:00 CET,
however, this problem does not arise as these times correspond to the closing times of the Tokyo and London stock
exchanges, respectively. Hence it is possible to obtain end-of-day data, which is available from 2001, and create
a de-facto intraday window from 13:00 to 19:00 CET. For the subsample of overlapping observations (2008-2016)
we tested for the difference in using the window ending with the press conference vs. later the same afternoon
and found it to be statistically insignificant.
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Figure 1.1: 1-year EONIA swap rate on 5 June 2008. Horizontal axis shows Central European
Time (CET). Source: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations.
that information about ECB policy can to a large degree be contained in the press conference,
compared to the policy announcement. An example where both the original announcement, as
well as the press conference convey substantial information to market participants is the meeting
on 6 October 2011. The press release once again stated that rates would remain unchanged.
However, this was not in line with market expectations for a cut and hence created a tightening
surprise that led to an immediate increase in the 1-year EONIA swap rate. During the press
conference, the then ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet re-emphasised that inflation rates had
remained at elevated levels. This in turn pushed market expectations towards tighter mone-
tary policy and caused a further jump in the swap rate. Naturally, there are also examples
where the press conference does not convey a significant amount of information to the market,
but the above cases highlight the need to include the press release in the high-frequency window.
The above discussion raises the question to which degree the various forms of information dis-
semination could be used to develop a more differentiated understanding of the nature of pol-
icy shocks. Previous contributions have suggested a separation of monetary policy instrument
shocks from monetary policy communication shocks, sometimes also termed target and path
shocks. For the euro area, work on this distinction is being pursued by Jarocinski and Karadi
(2018). For the purpose of our paper, we want to use a broad measure of monetary policy
shocks that encompasses all forms of surprises, whether they are to the instrument or expec-
tations. That said, we hope that the development of our instrument is informative for future
research on the manifold nature of monetary policy shocks within the euro area.
As we estimate a quarterly VAR, we have to turn the surprises on ECB meeting days into
quarterly average surprises. In practice, we first calculate the cumulative daily surprise over
12
















Figure 1.2: 1-year EONIA swap rate on 6 October 2011. Horizontal axis shows Central European
Time (CET). Source: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations.
the past quarter (93 days) for each day in our sample. In the next step we take the average
of this daily cumulative series over each quarter. In doing so, we incorporate the information
that some meetings happen early within a quarter while others happen later. Our averaging
procedure makes sure that a surprise happening late in the quarter has less influence on the
quarterly average than a surprise at the beginning of the quarter.11
To get a better understanding of the instrument, we plot its values in Figure 1.3. In partic-
ular, we want to point out events that led to particularly large positive or negative values in the
instrument to develop an intuition regarding the behaviour of the series. Proceeding chrono-
logically, the earliest of the four largest surprises happened in the fourth quarter of 2001, with
a value of -0.15. This data point is driven by the aggressive interest rate cut on 17 September
2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.12 The ECB cut all three interest rates by 50bp
leading to a drop in 1-year EONIA swaps of 20bp during our window. Another particularly
large negative shock appears in the fourth quarter of 2008. The value of -0.17 is mostly driven
by the monetary policy decision on 2 October 2008. Interest rates were kept unchanged on the
day, in line with expectations. However, President Trichet highlighted financial market turmoil
and weakness in the EA economy during his statement, leading to a large drop in the swap
rate between 14:30 and 15:30 CET as markets priced in future cuts to the policy rate. In the
following quarter, Q1 2009, our instrument records a particularly high reading of 0.14. This
goes back in large part to a contractionary monetary policy surprise during the meeting of 4
December 2008, but also to a surprise during the meeting of 15 January 2009. Interestingly,
11A similar approach was taking by Gertler and Karadi (2015) to create monthly FOMC surprises.
12Note that the surprise actually happened in the third quarter of 2001. However, because our averaging
approach takes into account whether a shock appears early or late in a quarter—and consequently, whether it has
a larger influence on the current or the next quarter—the policy decision from 17 September 2001 mostly affects
our instrument during Q4 2001.
13























Figure 1.3: Instrument - Quarterly 1-year EONIA swap rate surprises from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4
during both meetings, which happened at the height of the financial crisis, interest rates were
cut—by 75bp and 50bp, respectively. While this led to momentarily lower swap rates on both
occasions, rhetoric during the press conference led to further increases in the rate. In fact, on
both occasions, the President’s various dovish and hawkish comments led to the rate moving
up and down, but the contractionary sentiment dominated overall. Finally, we investigate the
events driving our instrument during Q3 2011. The negative value of -0.22—the largest value
in absolute terms during our sample period—mainly goes back to the policy decision on 4 Au-
gust 2011. After an interest rate hike at the previous meeting, policymakers left interest rates
unchanged on the day. As this was in line with expectations, the swap rate did not move at
13:45 CET. During the press conference, however, the ECB announced the decision to conduct a
liquidity-providing supplementary longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO), based on observed
tensions in financial markets within the euro area. This policy action amounted to a large dovish
surprise and 1-year EONIA swaps fell by about 18bp between 14:30 and 15:30 CET.
Finally, we test the strength of our instrument. We do so in a small VAR containing only
three variables: output, consumer prices and a policy indicator. The model is specified both at
monthly and quarterly frequency and is identified using high-frequency instruments based on 3,
6 and 12-month EONIA swaps. We report further details and all results in Appendix B, but
note here that in our baseline specification the instrument is strong, with a first-stage F-test
statistic of 19.45. This confirms the relevance of our external instrument.
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1.2.4 Data and Estimation
Our data set consists of quarterly observations from 1999 Q4 to 2016 Q4 on 90 area-wide
measures such as prices, output, investment, employment and housing, as well as 342 individual
country time series for the 11 early adopters of the Euro: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The vintage of the
data is June 2017. Appendix C lists all data series with detailed descriptions and notes on the
completeness and length of the individual series.
All data series are transformed to induce stationarity. Depending on the nature of the data,
this was done either by taking the first difference in logs or levels. Details on transformations can
also be found in Appendix C. As we lose one observation by differencing, our working dataset
starts in 2000 Q1.
Principal component analysis is sensitive to double-counting13 and we consequently only use
a subset of our data for factor extraction. In practice, we avoid double-counting along two di-
mensions. Firstly, we do not include euro area aggregates for indicators where we have included
all individual country series. Secondly, we do not include category aggregates, such as GDP,
when we have included its components, such as the components of GDP. Where possible, we
avoid using high-level aggregate series altogether and instead include disaggregate series. In
total, we use 179 series for factor extraction.
Table 1.1: Determining the number of common factors: Onatski (2009) test. The Table shows
p-values of the null of q0 common shocks against r0 < r ≤ r1 common shocks.
r0 vs r0 < r ≤ r1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.727 0.089 0.122 0.153 0.18 0.209 0.232
1 0 0.05 0.089 0.122 0.153 0.18 0.209
2 0 0 0.521 0.414 0.539 0.632 0.705
3 0 0 0 0.229 0.414 0.539 0.632
4 0 0 0 0 0.794 0.595 0.746
5 0 0 0 0 0 0.336 0.595
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.561
We rely on a number of specific tests and information criteria to determine the number of
common factors r. Specifically, we estimate them by means of the test proposed by Onatski
(2009), which suggests r ∈ 2, 3 (Table 1.1), the eigenvalue difference method proposed by Onatski
(2010) suggesting r = 2, the criterion by Bai and Ng (2002) suggesting r = 5, and the bi-cross-
validation method proposed by Owen and Wang (2015)14 suggesting r = 8. We choose as our
baseline specification r = 5, that is, the average of these results. Figure 13 in Appendix A shows
13see e.g. Stock and Watson (2012).
14see Figure 12 in Appendix A.
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Table 1.2: R-squared for regression of data series on five principal components. *Germany,










Gross Domestic Product 0.85 0.56 0.70 0.45
Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices
0.81 0.64 0.71 0.59
House Prices 0.71 0.46 0.52 0.40
Exports 0.76 0.54 0.49 0.58
Imports 0.75 0.58 0.45 0.69
Government Spending 0.18 0.68 0.77 0.59
Gross Fixed
Capital Formation
0.76 0.33 0.51 0.19
Consumption 0.61 0.30 0.34 0.27
Unemployment 0.72 0.51 0.68 0.36
Long-term Rates 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
Rents 0.41 0.35 0.32 0.38
Share Prices 0.65 0.58 0.59 0.57
Producer Prices in Industry 0.87 - - -
Wages 0.75 - - -
Employment 0.74 - - -
GER 2Y yield 0.98 - - -
Cost of Borrowing indicator 0.91 - - -
EONIA 0.99 - - -
Nominal Effective
Exchange Rate
0.12 - - -
the variance of the data explained by each additional factor. Five factors account for 80% of
the total data variance.15
On the basis of Akaike and Bayes Information Criteria we include one lag for the baseline of
the DFM.
To get a better understanding of how well the extracted factors characterise the data, Table
1.2 shows the variation in the data explained by the five factors. The second column shows the
fraction of explained variation for a selection of aggregate area-wide series. The third column
shows the corresponding average across series from individual member countries. In particular,
two observations stand out. Firstly, the variation in most aggregate series is remarkably well
explained by the five factors. With a few exceptions, notably the exchange rate, the R-squared
ranges between 70% and 99%. Secondly, despite the granularity of the individual country series,
the factors on average still explain more than half of all variation. In some cases, such as
HICP inflation, government spending and, most notably, long-term interest rates, they explain
15As can be seen in Figure 13, the bulk of the variance in the data is explained by the first two factors. In line
with this observation and the test results from Onatski (2009) and (2010), we re-estimate the DFM with only
two factors. We find that all main results of the 5-factor model hold. While the smaller amount of factors allow
for greater precision, the larger amount of factors gives us more explanatory power for the observable series. We
prefer the latter effect over the former and hence select 5 factors for our baseline specification.
16
considerably more. Columns 4 and 5 show the same information as column 3, but differentiate
between the size of the countries. In particular, we separate the 5 countries in our sample with
the largest economies (by nominal GDP) from the 6 countries with the smallest economies. As
expected, the factors pick up information from the large economies to a much greater extent
than for smaller economies. With the exception of exports, imports and rents, data from larger
economies is consistently explained better by the factors. This difference is particularly strong
for GDP (70% vs. 45%) and unemployment (68% vs. 36%). As concrete examples of the above,
Figure 17 in Appendix E plots fitted series on the basis of the 5 extracted factors against actual
(transformed) series for GDP and HICP in the euro area, Germany and Luxembourg.
1.3 Empirical Results
This section gives an overview of our empirical findings, starting at the euro area aggregate level
and subsequently exploring results on the country level.
1.3.1 Euro-wide Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy
We start our description of the results with an overview of a selection of aggregate series across
the euro area. Figure 1.4 shows percentage responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock
of 25 basis points (bp). As discussed in Section 1.2.3, the external instrument approach identifies
the shock only up to sign and scale. Using the response of EONIA as a policy indicator, we scale
the system to a 25bp contraction in EONIA. The shaded area around the point estimates signify
confidence intervals of one standard deviation, obtained from a wild bootstrapping procedure
with a simple (Rademacher) distribution. Given a strong instrument, the confidence intervals
obtained under this approach are valid despite the presence of heterogeneity. Because both stages
of the regression are incorporated in the bootstrapping procedure, the error from the external
instrument regression is accounted for. A similar approach has been followed by Mertens and






















































































































































































































































































































































Notably, our results do not suffer from the prize puzzle—the occurrence of rising prices in
reaction to a contractionary monetary policy shock. In fact, while the harmonised index of
consumer prices (HICP) does not have any significant reaction, our producer prices fall signif-
icantly, in line with economic theory. Given the longstanding struggle of VAR-type models to
get rid of the price puzzle, we interpret these findings as an indication of the ability of the model
to accurately characterise economic dynamics. In particular, we attribute the non-existence of
the price puzzle to the combination of correctly capturing information about prices in the econ-
omy (via the DFM) and precisely identifying monetary policy shocks (via the high frequency
instrument).16 The remainder of the series in Figure 1.4 also behave as suggested by theory.
GDP contracts overall, as do all components with the exception of Government Spending, which
increases in reaction to a contractionary shock. In line with theory, investment (GFCF) is a lot
more volatile than consumption, as are imports and exports. The reaction of the German 2-year
sovereign yield closely follows EONIA. The aggregate indicator for mortgage interest rates in the
euro area as compiled by the ECB also rises in reaction to a shock, but displays imperfect pass-
through as a significant number of mortgages are characterised by fixed rates that do not adapt
to changes in policy. In the labour market, unemployment rises, while wages fall. Interestingly,
the reaction in wages is not significant, hinting at a large degree of nominal wage stickiness. In
the housing market, house prices fall significantly after a contraction, following economic theory
that higher policy rates make mortgages more expensive and consequently suppress demand
for houses. Rents, on the other hand, increase in reaction to a shock. Recent research (see
e.g. Duarte and Dias, 2016) suggests that a worsening of conditions in the mortgage market
leads agents to substitute house purchase with renting, thus exerting pressure on rental prices.
Motivated by this result, Section 1.4 will take a closer look at the housing markets in the euro
area and explore potential avenues for connecting the results to economic theory.
1.3.2 Country-Level Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy
Moving on to results at the country level, we start to uncover the full potential of the DFM when
it comes to providing results for a large number of series. Of the 342 individual country series
in our data set, we have selected a representative sub-sample for Figures 1.5-1.7. In particular,
this section takes a closer look at the responses of GDP, the components of GDP, interest rates,
equities, housing prices and housing rents. We point out, however, that the model produces
impulse response functions for all series in our sample.
Figure 1.5 shows responses for real GDP and HICP across the 11 euro area countries in our
sample. While we omitted error bands for ease of presentation, it is noteworthy that reactions of
16We also applied the FAVAR approach proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005) using EONIA as the only observable
factor and found that the price puzzle was still present
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Figure 1.5: Percentage responses of real GDP to a 25bp contractionary policy shock across euro
area member countries.
GDP across countries are significantly heterogeneous. At one end of the spectrum, the reaction
of Irish GDP clearly differs from the five countries with the weakest reaction. That said, even the
reactions of Finland and Luxembourg are statistically different from France and Spain, having
non-overlapping confidence intervals from the 10th step onward. This heterogeneity is in itself
noteworthy, but also raises the question which parts of the economy are particularly prone to
asymmetric reactions.
For a first pass at this question, Figure 1.6 contains the reactions of the components of GDP.
A look at the IRFs offers two main conclusions. Firstly, some series, such as private consumption
and gross fixed capital formation tend to move in the same direction, or with similar patterns,
despite heterogeneity across countries. This compares to series such as government spending and
net exports, which in some instances even move in opposite directions. In part, these differences
in the general nature of responses can be explained by the determinants of the individual series.
Government spending, for example, is notoriously idiosyncratic, varying in degrees of pro- and
countercyclicality both across countries as well as within a country over time.
Secondly, we observe that even among series where responses across countries move in the
same direction, large degrees of heterogeneity exist. In particular, we point out the disparity
in reactions of private consumption. While German private consumption drops by a maximum
of about 0.02 percentage points, the drop in Ireland is more than 20 times as large at 0.4 per-
centage points. Aside from Ireland, which could be classified an outlier, countries such as Italy,
Finland, Spain and Portugal exhibit drops in consumption that are roughly 10 times the size of
20
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Figure 1.6: Percentage responses of GDP components to a 25bp contractionary policy shock
across euro area member countries.
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Figure 1.7: Percentage responses of long-term interest rates and local equity indices to a 25bp
contractionary policy shock across euro area member countries. Long-term interest rates are
defined in accordance with OECD methodology, conforming to government bonds of (in most
cases) 10 year maturity.
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Figure 1.8: Percentage responses of house prices and rents to a 25bp contractionary monetary
policy shock across euro area member countries.
the reaction in Germany. One of the core questions we ask in Section 1.4 is what may be the
cause of this degree of heterogeneity.
Taking a closer look at responses of other variables of interest, we find that the degree of
heterogeneity in responses seems to be closely (and inversely) related to the state of convergence
in a particular market across the euro area. In particular, financial markets have seen a large
degree of convergence,17 which is reflected in the reaction of interest rates and stock prices
across countries. Figure 1.7 shows that while the immediate impact of a policy shock on long-
term interest rates is not uniform across countries, their reaction over later periods is almost
identical. Similarly, a look at the responses of local equity indices, displayed in the same figure,
reveals a strong degree of homogeneity across equity markets. While stock prices show more
differentiated responses than long-term interest rates, the confidence intervals around stock price
IRFs are mostly overlapping.
Among the markets that have seen only very little or no convergence in institutional char-
acteristics are the labour and housing markets. It is the latter, seen in Figure 1.8, that we
investigate in more detail in Section 1.4, thus attempting to clarify the role of institutional
characteristics in shaping channels of the monetary transmission mechanism.18
In the following step, we propose a more rigorous approach to test heterogeneity among
17see e.g. ECB (2017).
18In Appendix F, we present an alternative way of looking at IRFs across countries to better understand the
statistical significance of our results. Figures 18 and 19 plot the highest and lowest responses, as well as EA IRFs
for various series with their respective confidence intervals. Figure 18 contains these responses for real variables:
GDP, private consumption and unemployment. Figure 19 shows responses for price-related series: interest rates,
HICP and stock prices. Comparing the two groups, we notice that the highest and lowest responses for none of
the real variables are overlapping. In contrast, IRFs are overlapping for most parts of the price-related series,
with only stock prices diverging around the 10th step.
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GDP 1.45 0.70 4.00
Private Consumption 1.19 1.01 2.52
Unemployment Rates 7.16 2.83 25.02
Housing Prices 2.03 1.51 4.57
Housing Rents 3.81 3.15 6.96
HICP 3.24 0.99 13.25
Long-term Interest Rates 0.21 0.14 0.53
Stock Prices 0.37 0.21 0.65
At the 20th Step
GDP 0.64 0.47 0.95
Private Consumption 1.02 0.99 1.11
Unemployment Rates 1.24 0.94 4.22
Housing Prices 1.08 0.84 2.02
Housing Rents 2.41 1.13 8.20
HICP 1.25 0.62 4.05
Long-term Interest Rates 0.46 0.17 1.87
Stock Prices 0.21 0.19 0.26
responses. For each set of responses, we calculate the coefficient of variation, i.e. the standard
deviation of responses (among countries) with respect to the EA response of the same variable.
To make this measure comparable across different types of series, we normalise it by the size
of the EA response. In doing so, we create a numerical measure for the dispersion of impulse
responses that allows for intuitive and meaningful comparison between series. Table 1.3 presents
the coefficients of variation for a selection of variables, both on impact, as well as at the 20th
step. Moreover, the table lists a lower and upper bound for the coefficients of variation, which
we obtain from including the calculation in our bootstrapping procedure. As can be clearly
seen, long-term interest rates and stock prices have a much smaller coefficient of variation than
the other presented variables. At the 20th step, GDP is also markedly less heterogeneous than
other variables such as private consumption.
As some of the intervals around coefficients of variation are overlapping, we also bootstrap
pair-wise differences in the coefficient of variation. The results, presented in Table 1.4, mostly
confirm earlier observations. Reactions of long-term interest rates (LTINT) and stock prices (SP)
are significantly less dispersed than all other variables. Moreover, at the 20th step, GDP has
a significantly lower coefficient of variation than private consumption (PCON), unemployment
(U), real house prices (RHPI) and real rents (RREN). A few additional pairwise tests also show
significance.
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Overall, the findings confirm our earlier statement: The degree of heterogeneity in responses
is lower in financial variables, such as interest rates and stock prices, as well as output, while
it is larger in consumption, consumer prices and variables related to the labour and housing
markets. Importantly, these results open up scope for potentially beneficial policy intervention.
Further institutional convergence might increase the efficiency and precision of monetary policy,
reducing unintended reactions in countries that would otherwise behave in an idiosyncratic
manner. That said, a much deeper understanding of the mechanisms at play is necessary to
justify policy intervention in the first place. By means of a case study, the following section takes
the first step in the direction of improving our understanding for the example of the housing
market.
Table 1.4: Bootstrapped pair-wise differences in the coefficient of variation of the cross-country
responses to a 25bp monetary policy shock. * marks differences in variation that are significant
at the 68% confidence level. The inference is drawn from a bootstrap procedure.
GDP HICP LTINT SP PCON U RHPI RREN
On Impact
GDP 0 -0.99 1.20* 1.06* 0.16 -5.42* -0.84 -2.15
HICP 0.99 0 3.02* 2.85* 1.69 -3.81 0.66 -0.41
LTINT -1.20* -3.02* 0 -0.13 -0.90* -6.66* -1.79* -3.43*
SP -1.06* -2.85* 0.13 0 -0.84* -6.84* -1.60* -3.32*
PCON -0.16 -1.69 0.90* 0.84* 0 -5.20* -0.75 -2.48*
U 5.42* 3.81 6.66* 6.84* 5.20* 0 5.02 3.46
RHPI 0.84 -0.66 1.79* 1.60* 0.75 -5.02 0 -1.51
RREN 2.15 0.41 3.43* 3.32* 2.48* -3.46 1.51 0
At the 20th Step
GDP 0 -0.55 0.21 0.45* -0.39* -0.59* -0.43* -1.74*
HICP 0.55 0 0.64 1.02* 0.19 -0.18 -0.16 -0.93*
LTINT -0.21 -0.64 0 0.24 -0.60 -0.99* -0.62 -1.65*
SP -0.45* -1.02* -0.24 0 -0.80* -1.04* -0.85* -2.17*
PCON 0.39* -0.19 0.60 0.80* 0 -0.20 0.00 -1.38*
U 0.59* 0.18 0.99 1.04* 0.20 0 0.20 -0.84
RHPI 0.43* 0.16 0.62 0.85* 0.00 -0.20 0 -0.66
RREN 1.74* 0.93* 1.65* 2.17* 1.38* 0.84 0.66 0
1.4 Case Study of Heterogeneous Monetary Policy Transmis-
sion in Euro Area Housing Markets
The recent literature has emphasized how the transmission of monetary policy operates through
a “housing transmission channel”.19 A focus on this channel is commonly motivated by noting
that for most households, the single most important item on the asset side of their balance sheet
19Among the various contributions, Iacoviello (2005) and Kaplan et al. (2016) call attention to credit and


















































































Figure 1.9: Correlation of house price response troughs and rent response peaks with home
ownership rates. Figures exclude Ireland and Portugal.
is their home. In the form of the mortgage, it typically corresponds to a household’s largest
liability. In this section, we employ our dynamic factor model for the euro area to investigate
the housing channel in more detail. Concretely, we will make use of the European setting to
explore how various details of the housing channel shape the transmission of monetary shocks.
A remarkable feature of European housing markets are their substantial differences in insti-
tutional characteristics. Mortgage markets differ markedly in the relative share of fixed versus
flexible rate contracts and maximum loan-to-value ratios, rental markets are subject to different
regimes and controls, and property taxation is very heterogeneous, to name but a few aspects—
see Osborne (2005), Andrews et al. (2011) and Westig and Bertalot (2016) for a comprehensive
overview. Indeed, the effect of institutional characteristics on the transmission of monetary pol-
icy has previously been explored by Calza et al. (2013), who however focus mostly on housing
finance.
Our point of departure is the idea that the transmission of monetary policy should be stronger
in an environment where rents and house prices move more in response to a shock. This—as we
explain below—may occur where home ownership rates are high.
To bring this idea to the data, we use our dynamic factor model to trace out the transmission
of a monetary policy shock through house prices and rents, as well as mortgage rates and cost of
finance, with the goal of shedding light on each constituent component of the housing channel.
Figure 1.8 shows impulse response functions for house prices and rents across the euro area.
As anticipated, house prices and rents feature a strong degree of heterogeneity, both in a qualita-
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tive as well as quantitative sense. In particular, we note that while the majority of house prices
fall in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, rents in fact rise in most countries.
This is also reflected in the aggregate responses of euro area house prices and rents as seen in
Figure 1.4. This dichotomy may seem counterintuitive when looking at rents and house prices
from an asset pricing perspective: House prices should reflect the discounted sum of expected
future rents, leading to parallel movements in both. While an asset pricing approach is helpful in
explaining price developments when housing takes on the role of an investment good, it neglects
particularities of housing as a consumption good. When an interest rate shock hits the housing
market, mortgages become more expensive, which consequently leads to a fall in the demand
for houses and hence their price. As highlighted in the recent literature,20 when faced with
more expensive mortgages, home buyers, at the margin, not only scale down the size of their
mortgage (and house), but also substitute buying a house with renting. In doing so, demand
for rental properties goes up, leading to an increase in rents. In line with our hypothesis above,
the ability of a rental market to absorb the mass of agents that switch from buying to renting
may be closely linked to the size of the rental market or, inversely, to the home ownership rate
of a country. To get a better understanding of the importance of the home ownership rate in
the transmission channel, in Figure 1.9 we plot the maximum response of each country’s house
price and rent IRF against the home ownership rate. Seeing that the responses of Ireland and
Portugal are highly idiosyncratic, we treat them as outliers at this stage and do not include
them in the scatter plots. Note that the correlation of consumption to rents is weakened by the
inclusion of Ireland and Portugal, while all other correlations are strengthened by their inclusion.
Before analysing the scatter plots in detail, a note of caution regarding their interpretation
is in order. With only 9 data points, our plots are meant to motivate and inform a structured
approach to the monetary transmission channel—to be pursued in future research—rather than
uncovering statistically significant relationships.
The right panel of Figure 1.9 plots the peak of rent responses against home ownership rates.
The correlation is positive: The higher the home ownership rate, the larger the increase in rents.
As indicated above, this finding is in line with the idea that housing is not only an asset, but also
a consumption good. To gain insight on how this matters for monetary policy, observe that, if a
shock reduces the demand for housing, so that households switch to renting, the vacancy rate in
the housing stock for sale temporarily increases—since conversions between homes for sale and
homes for renting are limited. Correspondingly, the pressure on the rental market builds up.
Indeed, in countries where the rental market is insufficiently deep, as may be the case when the
market is small (i.e., the ownership rate is high), everything else equal, new entrants will exert
a greater upward pressure on prices. In the euro area, there are strong cross-border differences
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Figure 1.10: Correlation of house price response troughs and rent response peaks with private
consumption response troughs. Figures exclude Ireland and Portugal.
in this respect. In Germany, a deep rental market can easily absorb substantial movements
at the extensive margin, with agents switching from buying to renting or vice-versa, without
experiencing significant variations in rents. At the other extreme, Spain, Finland or Italy, where
rental markets are relatively small, reflecting a number of institutional constraints, new entrants
can lead to substantial changes in rents.
What remains to be shown is that the rental market actually forms a significant component
of the housing channel. To address this issue, we plot the trough (minimum) of house price
responses and peak (maximum) of rent responses against the response in private consumption.
As can be seen on the two panels, consumption is strongly linked to both changes in house
prices as well as changes in rents. The link between house prices and consumption points to
a strong wealth effect of monetary policy, stressed by Mian et al. (2013) among others. The
larger the drop in house prices, the stronger the direct impact on households’ balance sheets,
leading to a cut in consumption. Looking at rents, on the other hand, we see a strong negative
relationship. Households who pay rent are, on average, less wealthy than households who receive
rents, i.e. owners of rental properties. Given a marginal propensity to consume that is decreasing
in wealth, this implies that, after an increase in rents, renters as a group cut consumption by a
larger amount than landlords increase their consumption, leading to a negative demand shock
overall. Moreover, it is plausible that, after a contractionary policy shock (associated with an
increase in rents), more renters may become liquidity and credit constrained, causing them to























































































Figure 1.11: Correlation of private consumption and GDP response troughs with home ownership
rates. Figures exclude Ireland and Portugal.
our results suggests that the housing channel should be investigated in its multiple components,
including house prices and rents. The importance of these components in turn depends on
institutional characteristics, such as the home ownership rate, which is plausibly related to
housing finance.
Having traced the effect of the home-ownership rate to consumption through house prices
and rents, as a last step we investigate whether we can make out a direct relationship between
the home ownership rate and changes in consumption. Figure 1.10 plots the trough of private
consumption responses against home ownership rates. The figure uncovers a surprisingly clear
correlation. This result foreshadows large potential benefit from a systematic analysis of in-
stitutional characteristics in relation to the monetary transmission mechanism, in particular in
a heterogeneous environment such as the EA. At the same time, it lends support to models
stressing the housing channel.
1.5 Conclusion
Using a dynamic factor model with high frequency identification, this paper investigated the
heterogeneous effects of monetary policy across the euro area. In doing so, we contribute to the
literature by creating an external instrument for monetary policy identification and, by means
of a case study on housing, presented a novel way of uncovering heterogeneity in the monetary
transmission mechanism. The analysis has produced three main results.
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Monetary policy transmission in the euro area appears to be persistently heterogenous across
member countries. In this paper, we provided evidence consistent with the idea that the degree of
heterogeneity is inversely related to the degree of cross-border institutional convergence. While
country-level financial variables and output react fairly similarly to the same monetary policy
shock, variables naturally related to markets that have seen little convergence, such as housing
and labour markets, react in significantly asymmetric ways.
We elaborate on this point with a case study of European housing markets. We show that dif-
ferences in the home ownership rate—an indicator reflecting many dimensions in which national
housing markets differ from each other—is strongly correlated with the strength of monetary
policy transmission across countries. Moreover, we show the importance of looking at the dif-
ferent components of the housing channel, including rents, in addition to house prices. Indeed,
our analysis shows that, in most countries, house prices and rents respond to a contractionary
policy shock in different directions, yet both contribute to a fall in consumption.
Our results point to a number of promising directions for future research. Firstly, once data
availability improves, it would be highly interesting to break down our external instrument and
uncover not only shocks to general monetary policy, but also to sub-components, such as mon-
etary policy communications shocks or monetary policy instrument shocks. Secondly, our case
study on the housing market is only of exploratory nature. In addition to the home ownership
rate, many other institutional characteristics merit a closer look: loan-to-value ratios, aggre-
gate mortgage debt to GDP and ease of credit, to name just a few. Finally, markets other than
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A Selecting the Number of Factors - Additional Figures
















Figure 12: Bi-cross-validation method proposed by Owen and Wang (2015)





























Figure 13: Variance explained by each additional factor
B Small VAR with High-Frequency Identification
In this section we use our instrument to identify monetary policy shocks in a simple VAR with
three variables: output, consumer prices and a policy indicator. This simpler setting is useful
to test the strength of the external instrument. Estimating a simple VAR for monthly and
quarterly data, we test different instruments and policy indicators. The set of instruments to be
tested comprises 3-month, 6-month and 12-month EONIA futures. The set of policy indicators
35








































Figure 14: VAR using monthly data from 2000 to 2016. Here we show the responses to a one
standard deviation shock in the policy indicator, comparing the high-frequency identification
with a Cholesky identification strategy. The dashed lines report the bootstrapped 68% confi-
dence intervals. The Cholesky identification orders the policy indicator last. The F-test for the
first-stage regression on the external instrument is 4.85 and the R2 is 2 percent.
is given by EONIA, one-year aggregate EA bond yields, one-year German government bond
yields, as well as two-year German government bond yields. We use industrial production (IP)
as a measure of output for monthly data, and real GDP for quarterly data. For consumer prices,
we use HICP at both frequencies.
The combination of policy indicator and instrument that provides the best instrument
strength is the one selected to report the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks on out-
put and consumer prices. For monthly data, the selected instrument is the 3-month EONIA
future and the policy indicator is the two-year German government bond rate, while for the
quarterly data the instrument that works best is the one-year EONIA future and the policy
indicator is the one-year German government bond rate.
In order to compare our identification strategy for the EA with a more standard identification,
we also estimate the impulse-response functions using the Cholesky decomposition with the
following ordering: output, consumer prices and policy indicator. The results with monthly data
are reported in Figure 14. The more traditional approach to identify monetary policy surprises
36
exhibits both a price puzzle and an output puzzle. Interestingly, when using our external
instrument approach, both puzzles disappear. The external instrument delivers responses that
are more in line with standard economic theory where output falls temporarily and recovers in
the medium-run (neutrality), and prices fall. In this specification, the instrument is weak as its
F-test is below 10 which implies the possibility of biased estimates in a small sample such as
ours. However, in the case of a just identified IV, it is possible to get approximately unbiased
(or less biased) estimates even with weak instruments.
Using quarterly data, we get a significantly stronger instrument with a first-stage F-test
of 19.45. Figure 15 shows the same set of variable responses, now using quarterly data. The
Cholseky identification does not feature a price puzzle in this setup. There is, however, an
output puzzle. With the high-frequency identification, on the other hand, we only get a price
puzzle on the contemporaneous response, while there is no output puzzle. The limitations of
an identification strategy based on timing restrictions are further highlighted at the quarterly
frequency as it is hard to argue that consumer prices (collected on a monthly basis) do not
react in the same quarter to monetary policy surprises. If we want to allow prices to respond
contemporaneously, we can order consumer prices last (instead of the monetary policy indicator).
However, in this case we also get the undesirable restriction of not letting monetary policy
react to consumer prices contemporaneously. The external instrument is able circumvent this
limitation.
Figure 16 shows the responses when we order the consumer prices last in the Cholesky de-
composition. In this case, consumer prices are allowed to react contemporaneously to monetary
policy shocks. When the consumer price response is not contemporaneously restricted to zero,
we find that the price puzzle is present and, contrary to the high-frequency identification, it
lasts for a few quarters after the shock hits the economy.
37







































Figure 15: VAR using quarterly data from 2000 to 2016. Here we show the responses to a one
standard deviation shock in the policy indicator using the high-frequency identification and the
Cholesky identification. The dashed lines report the bootstrapped 68% confidence intervals. The
Cholesky identification orders the policy indicator last. The F-test for the first-stage regression
on the external instrument is 19.45 and the R2 is 22 percent.
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Figure 16: VAR using quarterly data from 2000 to 2016. Here we show the responses to a one
standard deviation shock in the policy indicator using high-frequency and Cholesky identifica-
tion. The dashed lines report the bootstrapped 68% confidence intervals. Here, the Cholesky
identification orders the consumer prices last. The F-test for the first-stage regression on the
external instrument is 19.45 and the R2 is 22 percent.
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C Data Set
Table 5 contains a complete list of the series in our data set as well as detailed descriptions and
information regarding transformations, geographical coverage and sources. Abbreviations and
codes are laid out in the following:
Transformation code (T)
1 - no transformation
2 - difference in levels
4 - logs
5 - difference in logs
Geography
EA - Euro area
EA12 - Euro area (12 countries)
EA19 - Euro area (19 countries)
EACC - Euro area (changing composition)
EA11 i - 11 individual series for sample countries
Factor analysis (F)
Y - included in data set for principal component analysis
Seasonal adjustment
WDSA - working day and seasonally adjusted
SA - seasonally adjusted
NA - neither working day nor seasonally adjusted
Note: National house price indices have different start dates across countries. They begin in
2005 Q4 for Spain, 2006 Q2 for France, 2007 Q1 for Luxembourg, 2008 Q1 for Portugal, 2010
Q1 for Italy and Austria, and 2005 Q1 for all other countries. Furthermore, unemployment data
for France between 2000 Q1 and 2005 Q1, as well as Luxembourg between 2000 Q1 and 2003 Q1
is only available annually and has been linearly interpolated to create a quarterly data series.
Thereafter all unemployment data is quarterly. Finally, import and export data for Germany,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D On Interpreting Factors
For Table 6, we regress each transformed data series on one of the 5 factors at a time and
subsequently report the series where these regression resulted in the highest R2. While by
nature principal component analysis does not identify factors economically, the table gives a
rough indication of the information represented by them. On this basis, we suggest the following
tentative interpretation:
Factor 1 is likely to represent prices in the economy. It shows a high correlation with a
variety of price indices, from producer prices to HICP, and explains over half of the variance
in these series. Factor 2 is very closely related to measures of interest rates. This includes
money-market rates, as well as borrowing rates for house purchase. Factors 3 and 4 appear
to contain a substantial amount of information about labour markets, with high correlations to
unit labour cost and unemployment rates. That said, the factors are also closely related to other
variables and an interpretation seem much more contentious than for factors 1 and 2. Factor 5
picks up information from various areas of macroeconomic activity and we do not believe that
a straightforward interpretation of the factor is possible.
On the whole, we can emphasise that factors 1 and 2 seem to represent the economic concepts
of prices and interest rates. More generally, the latter could also be interpreted as representing
financial conditions.
46
Table 6: List of series that are best explained by a single extracted factor according to R-squared
of a linear regression of the (transformed) series on the respective factor.
Series R-squared
Factor 1
Producer Prices in Industry 0.67
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 0.56
Industrial Turnover Index, Manufacturing 0.53
Compensation of Employees 0.49
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Price Index 0.48
Factor 2




Long-term Interest Rate Belgium 0.43
Factor 3
Government Spending Italy 0.61
Unit Labour Cost Germany 0.61
Government Spending Finland 0.61
Unit Labour Cost Luxembourg 0.60




Real House Prices Ireland 0.44
Unemployment Finland 0.43
Real House Prices France 0.43
Factor 5
Real House Prices Netherlands 0.46
GDP Spain 0.40
Private Consumption Spain 0.33
House Prices Netherlands 0.32
Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Construction 0.32
47
E Explanatory Power of Factors













































Figure 17: The figure compares actual (transformed) GDP and HICP data with corresponding
fitted series on the basis of 5 extracted factors for the euro area (EA), Germany and Luxem-
bourg from 2000 Q1 to 2016 Q4. Germany and Luxembourg represent the largest and smallest
economies in our sample, respectively. In DFM terminology, the fitted series represent the
systematic component of the data series, while the actual series also contains an idiosyncratic
component.
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F Highest and lowest responses to monetary policy shock






































Figure 18: Highest/lowest percentage responses of selected real variables to a 25bp contrac-
tionary policy shock across euro area member countries.






































Figure 19: Highest/lowest percentage responses of selected prices to a 25bp contractionary policy







For many decades, capital controls have caused controversy and led to intense debate amongst
international policy makers. While the founders of the IMF, led by J.M. Keynes and H.D. White,
fostered some scepticism of liberalised capital accounts and free international capital flows, the
institutional view of the IMF soon turned in favour of free capital flows. The “Washington
Consensus”, a set of economic policy guidelines promoted by Washington-based institutions
such as the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department in the second half of the
20th century, unambiguously spoke out in favour of free capital movements on a global scale. In
doing so, they highlighted the potentially harmful aspects of capital controls: Similar to tariffs
on goods trade, capital controls could change relative prices, giving one country a competitive
advantage at the expense of another. Importantly, the assumption was that even in a second-
best world, every step taken towards the liberalisation of financial markets would increase overall
welfare. However, rapid capital flow reversals during the Latin American and South-East Asian
crises in the 1980s and 90s fundamentally challenged this institutional view. Policy debate
focussed on the ability of capital controls to prevent crisis phenomena, such as sudden stops
and capital flight. The recent Great Recession and Global Financial Crisis have only served
to reinforce debate about a more differentiated approach to capital controls, eventually even
leading to the IMF’s official adoption of a balanced view.1
Acknowledging the conflicting properties of capital controls—negative when coming at the
cost of another country, positive when safeguarding financial stability—a host of recent research
has set out to gain further insights about the mechanisms underlying capital controls. Heathcote
1see Ostry et al. (2010) and Ostry et al. (2012).
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and Perri (2014) provide a particularly striking result that, even when leaving aside aspects of
financial stability, capital controls can act as a macroeconomic stabiliser and increase risk sharing
between countries. This finding, that in a second-best world closing some markets can be Pareto
improving, has the potential to simplify the political process of implementing controls in the first
place. Taking it as the starting point for my own research, I aim to deepen the understanding
of how capital controls can be used to share risk internationally.
In summary, Heathcote and Perri (2014) show that capital controls can preserve risk sharing
properties of terms of trade movements when pecuniary externalities would otherwise distort
them. In their paper, the authors compare a model in which two countries can trade one non-
contingent bond to a model of complete financial autarky. The latter is representative of a world
with capital controls of the most extreme kind—a complete shut-down in the trade of all financial
assets. The clarity of this approach allows the authors to showcase their main results. However,
having such a blunt measure of capital controls also obscures the view to further insights. For
this reason, I create a model that allows for a continuous spectrum of capital controls in the
form of a tax on bond returns. The main questions in this context are: How large should taxes
on international capital flows be to optimally insure against uncertainty? And how large are
the additional welfare gains compared to the more blunt approach of shutting down asset trade
completely?
The second aim of my research is to generalise the applicability of the framework used in
Heathcote and Perri (2014) to a capital controls question. When examining the response of
the terms of trade to a productivity shock, Heathcote and Perri (2014) restrict themselves to
calibrations for the elasticity of substitution between domestically and foreign produced goods
where the terms of trade deteriorate in response to a positive productivity shock. This can
lead to what Bhagwati (1958) labelled “immiserising growth”, when the deterioration in the
terms of trade outweighs the gain in productivity. Consequently, capital controls that dampen
the reaction of the terms of trade have the potential to increase welfare. Importantly, however,
the reaction of the terms of trade to productivity shocks is discontinuous and non-monotonic
in the trade elasticity. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) show that a very low elasticity leads
to the opposite reaction in the terms of trade. The logic goes that for very low elasticities, a
deterioration in the terms of trade (i.e. a fall in the price of the relatively more abundant home
good) cannot be an equilibrium solution, as demand from foreign consumers no longer matches
supply. The only way to clear markets is to boost home income through a favourable move in
the terms of trade. The question remains unanswered, however, whether the result that no trade
in assets can be favourable to some trade in assets extends to this region.
In answering this question, I confront the paper’s main computational challenge. As welfare
differences between models are by nature small, it becomes necessary to find solutions using more
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precise higher order approximations. In particular, I use third order approximations, which take
various features into account that would be neglected in a linear approximation, most impor-
tantly a precautionary savings motive. Whilst the steady state of small open economies with
incomplete asset markets depends on initial conditions, the effects of such higher order approx-
imation can help to pin down steady-state values—in particular the bond position—and thus
close the model. However, Andreasen et al. (2013) show that using third order approximations
can also produce explosive sample paths which leads to the unconditional mean of the sample
being different from the steady state. Their suggested solution is a systematic pruning of the
state space and thus removing terms of orders higher than the approximation order. Doing so
can in turn destroy the equilibrating effects of higher orders mentioned above. The exact work-
ings of this interplay are subject of ongoing study, but current results suggest that an ad-hoc
device as suggested in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) can be used to equilibrate the model. In
particular, combining a pruning approach with Uzawa preferences succeeds in overcoming both
explosiveness issues of the sample path as well as equilibrating problems of the model itself.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 gives a detailed overview of the
related literature with a particular focus on welfare analysis and capital controls. Section 2.3
presents the model. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I present the calibration as well as the computational
approach. Results are presented in Section 2.6, whilst Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Whilst the literature on capital controls has expanded rapidly over recent years, there are varying
rationales for including capital controls in a model. The two most common reasons for modelling
capital controls are financial stability and terms of trade manipulations. This section will give
a broad overview of both strands of the literature. Corresponding to the aim of this paper,
however, the focus will be on the latter.
As mentioned above, the paper extends the work of Heathcote and Perri (2014). De Paoli and
Lipinska (2013) present a very similar setup, but with a fundamentally different result. Whereas
Heathcote and Perri find situations in which capital controls can increase insurance between
countries, De Paoli and Lipinska state that restricting international capital movements “critically
limits cross-border pooling of risk.” This difference goes back to fundamental assumptions about
capital in the economy. In Heathcote and Perri, endogenous capital accumulation magnifies
pecuniary externalities. Critically, firms do not internalise the effect of their decisions on the
terms of trade and overinvest after a positive shock to productivity, making the presence of
capital accumulation in the model a crucial determinant of relative supply and demand. On
the other hand, not featuring productive capital in their model, De Paoli and Lipinska (2013)
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find that imposing capital controls will always only benefit one of the two countries in the
model. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015) also look at terms of trade deteriorations when capital
markets are open, but put the focus of their work on the effect of capital controls on financial
stability. By introducing an adjustment cost to capital, their model exhibits an amplification
mechanism where sudden stops and fire sales lead to sharp corrections in prices. Costinot et al.
(2014) also focus on terms of trade movements, but look at them from the perspective of the
“optimal tariff theory”. The paper solves for the optimal capital flow tax a country has to
implement in order to maximise the monopoly rent it can extract from other countries. The
core of this argument can already be found in a discussion between Keynes (1929) and Ohlin
(1929) in the context of German transfer payments after the first World War. The idea that
a country can maximise its monopoly rent by introducing capital controls can also be found
in a number of earlier contributions (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). Ostry et al. (2012)
take a look at how one country’s capital controls spill over into other countries. Addressing
policy makers, they try to identify “rules of the road” to make sure multilateral considerations
are taken into account whenever controls are employed. These spillover effects are estimated
empirically in Lambert et al. (2011) and Forbes et al. (2012). A more general survey of empirical
work on capital controls can be found in Magud et al. (2011).
Of the models focussing on financial stability, recent contributions include Bianchi and Men-
doza (2013), where countries face default risk. Capital controls improve financial stability as
individual agents do not internalise the effect of their actions on the government’s incentives to
default. In Bianchi (2011) and Korinek (2011) asset-price movements tighten an exogenously
imposed collateral constraint, leading to inefficiencies (see also Caballero and Krishnamurty,
2004). In Martin and Taddei (2013), capital controls help to smooth informational frictions
arising from private information. Another noteworthy strand of literature explores the benefits
of capital controls in settings with price and wage rigidities. Amongst them, Farhi and Werning
(2014a) find that, defying the Mundellian view, capital controls are desirable even when the
exchange rate is flexible. In a different contribution, Farhi and Werning (2014b) present how
ex-post contingent transfers can implement an efficient insurance arrangement in fiscal unions.
The main mechanism through which capital controls affect outcomes in this paper are move-
ments in the terms of trade. Helpman and Razin (1978) were the first ones to bring forward
the idea that these movements can provide an automatic insurance mechanism. The idea has
been formalised in a seminal contribution by Cole and Obstfeld (1991), showing that under
specific circumstances, in particular a unitary elasticity of substitution between traded goods,
this insurance can be perfect.2 Deviating from this case, Corsetti et al. (2008) show that terms
2The parameterisation under which insurance is perfect has subsequently become known as the “Cole-Obstfeld”
case.
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of trade movements can be very large when elasticities of substitution are low, giving rise to a
potential role for policy intervention. Taking a closer look at cross-border insurance, the authors
demonstrate that financial flows and relative prices can be either complements or substitutes in
providing insurance. It is this interplay between financial flows and relative prices which will be
central to understanding the mechanisms at play in this paper.
Finally, it is necessary to share a word on the computational literature that has been
quintessential for this paper. Given the dimensionality of the state-space in New Open Economy
Macroeconomic (NOEM) models, the parsimony owing to perturbation methods is particularly
sought-after. Moreover, to attain accurate welfare calculations, and economically meaning-
ful differences, I use a third-order approximation. Although higher-order approximations are
straightforward to compute, they regularly generate explosive simulation paths arising from the
additional fixed points that higher-order terms induce (Den Haan and De Wind, 2012). Kim,
Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2008) were amongst the first to propose a solution to this problem:
A pruning approach—leaving out terms in the solution that have effects of higher order than
the approximation—to high-order approximations for non-linear stochastic rational expectations
models. In particular, they described an algorithm for calculating second-order approximations
and show that explosive simulation paths are avoided. Based on their work, Andreasen et al.
(2013) propose a generalised pruning method to calculate approximations above second order,
exploring the econometric and macroeconomic implications of the method.3 In this paper, I use
the pruning algorithms of Andreasen et al. (2013). The welfare calculations presented below
rely on simulations, making it paramount that simulations are stationary. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first application of pruning methods to the NOEM literature.
However, the application of pruning to NOEM models is complicated by another strand of
literature emphasising computational issues with open economy models as well as questions of
multiplicity. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) show that a linearised small open economy model
can have an undetermined bond position in equilibrium and propose tools to pin it down.4
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) advocate the use of ‘stationarity-inducing devices’, such as
Uzawa-type preferences, to close such models. Heathcote and Perri (2014) circumvent this
issue with a third-order approximation. In their model, a third-order approximation captures
effects such as a precautionary savings motive that determines the models equilibrium. When
applying a pruning approach, however, higher-order terms are removed and with them parts
of equilibrating effects such as the precautionary savings motive that are needed to close the
3In related research, Lombardo and Uhlig (2014) provide a theory of pruning and formulas for pruning of any
order and relate the method to results described by Judd (1998) on perturbing dynamical systems.
4Bodenstein (2011) demonstrates that large open economies can suffer from multiple steady states (even
in financial autarky) and in turn proposes methods to eliminate all but one equilibrium. Bodenstein (2011)
emphasises that this issue is distinct from the non-stationarity discussed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
Here I circumvent Bodenstein’s critique by calibration and steady state definition.
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model. To solve both problems here—explosiveness of simulations and non-stationarity—I use
Uzawa-type preferences alongside pruning.
2.3 The Model
The general setup follows the model in Heathcote and Perri (2014), which in turn is an adaptation
of the canonical Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) two-country, two-good model. Each country
i = 1, 2 is characterised by two types of profit-maximising firms, producing traded intermediary
goods and non-traded final goods, the latter used for consumption and investment. Identical,
infinitely-lived households own the companies, consume final goods, provide labour, rent out
capital and make investment decisions. Every period t, one state of the world st ∈ S is realised.
The history of realised states up to and including period t is expressed by st ≡ (s1, ..., st).
2.3.1 Preferences and Technologies









t) denotes the discount factor for future periods, defined, unless otherwise stated,
to be β ∈ (0, 1). π(st) is the probability at date 0 of history st, and cit and nit are period
consumption and labour, respectively, in country i. I consider a standard utility function which
is separable in consumption and hours worked:
U(ci, ni) =
c1−γi







where γ determines the degree of risk aversion, while ε is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
Under the baseline calibration of γ, ε = 1, the utility function becomes separable between the
log of consumption and a term involving hours worked:




Intermediate goods firms produce country specific goods a (in Country 1) and b (in Country
2), using a Cobb-Douglas production technology of the form




where zi is an exogenous productivity shock, ki is accumulated country-specific capital employed,
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Li is the labour endowment of the country (which I interchangeably also interpret as the size of
the country), and θ defines the share of capital in the production. Goods a and b are the only
traded goods in the model.















Final goods in each country are produced using a combination of intermediate goods a and

























for Country 1 and 2, respectively, with ai and bi denoting the quantity of goods a and b em-
ployed in country i. The coefficient ω ∈ {0, 1} determines the ratio between home and foreign
intermediary goods used in the production of each country’s final good. A value of ω > 0.5
results in home bias, whereas a value below 0.5 produces an anti-home or foreign bias. The
coefficient σ determines the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign-produced inter-
mediate goods. In the limit as σ → 1, the production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form. The
final good is used for both consumption and investment, augmenting the capital stock in the
following way:
ki(s
t) = (1− δ)ki(st−1) + xi(st), (2.9)
where xi(s
t) is the amount of the country i final good used for investment in country i, and δ is
the rate of depreciation.
The resulting resource constraints in the model are
F (z1(s
t), k1(s
t−1), n1(st)) = a1(st) + a2(st) (2.10)
F (z2(s
t), k2(s
t−1), n2(st)) = b1(st) + b2(st) (2.11)







for final goods, where i = 1, 2.
2.3.2 Firm Problems
Intermediate goods-producing firms hire labour and capital from households at market rates
wi(s
t) and ri(s
t), respectively, in units of the final good.5 Their maximisation problems in
countries 1 and 2 are, respectively:
max
n1(st),k1(st−1)
{qa1(st)F (z1(st), k1(st−1), n1(st))− w1(st)n1(st)− r1(st)k1(st−1)} (2.13)
max
n2(st),k2(st−1)
{qb2(st)F (z2(st), k2(st−1), n2(st))− w2(st)n2(st)− r2(st)k2(st−1)}, (2.14)
where qai (s
t) and qbi (s
t) are the prices at which intermediate goods are traded in country i.
Final goods-producing firms then buy inputs ai(s
t) and bi(s
t) on the home and foreign
intermediate goods markets to maximise their static optimisation problem:
max
ai(st),bi(st)
{Gi(ai(st), bi(st))− qai (st)ai(st)− qbi (st)bi(st)}. (2.15)
2.3.3 Terms of Trade and the Real Exchange Rate
As described above, one of the central stabilising properties of the model will rely on the move-
ment in the terms of trade p(st). They are defined as the price of the foreign good relative to
the home good. In equilibrium, this corresponds to the marginal rate of transformation between


















By this definition, an increase in the terms of trade is equal to a deterioration from the point
of view of Country 1.
The real exchange rate rx(st) is defined as the ratio of prices paid for the same intermediate












By this definition, too, an increase in the real exchange rate is equal to a deterioration from the
point of view of Country 1.
5In a number of closely related setups, intermediate goods-producing firms own the capital and make investment
decisions themselves. However, for the intertemporal decision between paying out dividends and investing in the
capital stock, I assume that firms use the discount factor of the representative household. Modelling ownership
of capital directly with the households hence does not change the analytical result, whilst improving the clarity
of the exposition.
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2.3.4 Household Problem and Capital Controls
Households maximise lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint, which leaves them with
decisions about consumption, supplying labour to intermediary goods-producing firms, investing
in productive capital and, if possible, investing in financial assets. As the possibility to invest in
financial assets constitutes the main interest of this research, I will focus on comparing different
setups that allow agents to make investment decisions in a more or less constrained way.
Complete Markets The benchmark case is given by a complete markets (CM) scenario,
where agents can invest in a full set of state-contingent securities at price P (st, st+1), equal to
the number of possible states of the world. To achieve symmetry in the results, each security
pays out half a unit of the domestic and half a unit of the foreign consumption good.6 The













































Bond Economy Secondly, I will look at a bond economy (BE) where agents have the option
to invest in only one international non-contingent bond. To preserve symmetry, the bond pays
out half a unit of the domestic and half a unit of the foreign consumption good. A particular
interest of the paper lies in the introduction of a moderate form of capital controls, where this
bond can still be traded, but facing a tax τi. To this end, I introduce a BE model with taxes
that nests a pure BE at τ = 0. The budget constraints for this case are
c1(s
















6Although seemingly unrealistic, the assumption about bond payoffs does not change the underlying mecha-
nisms. The bond could be defined as paying out one unit of the domestic good or, alternatively, as paying out
one unit of the foreign good without altering the extent to which countries can share risks. The only difference
lies in the property that symmetry is perfectly preserved under the specified bond. This in turn makes it possible
to compare welfare more easily across countries and models.
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c2(s













































, i = 2.
(2.22)
Financial Autarky As the limiting case for the scenario of extremely high capital controls
which lead to a complete shut-down of asset trade, I will finally take a look at a financial autarky







t−1) i = 1, 2. (2.23)
One interesting aspect of the numerical solution will lie in replicating the FA model through the
imposition of prohibitively high capital controls.
There are four different constellations through which a capital controls tax can affect a
country’s agents:
• τi > 0, Bi > 0: Subsidy on international lending. The country is a net-lender and
accumulates bonds. With a positive tax, the return on the bond position gets larger,
making agents wanting to increase their bond position further.
• τi > 0, Bi < 0: Tax on international borrowing. As the country is a net-borrower, having
a positive tax on bond returns makes it more expensive to borrow. Agents will want to
reduce their bond holdings.
• τi < 0, Bi > 0: Tax on international lending. The country is a net-lender, but the tax on
bonds reduces returns. Compared to no tax, agents will want to hold less bonds.
• τi < 0, Bi < 0: Subsidy on international borrowing. The negative tax reduces the costs of
borrowing money. Agents will want to borrow more.
It becomes clear that a capital controls tax seeking to reduce trade in bonds has to be of the
opposite sign as a country’s bond position, whereas a policy to increase borrowing and lending
needs both tax and bond position to be of the same sign. In other words, even taking the
simplifying assumption of constant taxes in absolute value,7 the sign of the tax has to change
7Simplifying taxes by making them constant over time is in fact a significant step in taking the model closer to
reality. As documented in Eichengreen and Rose (2014), capital controls are usually highly static, corresponding
to a constant, rather than a constantly adjusted tax.
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depending on the bond position of the country. This presents the computational challenge of
solving the model despite the obvious break in the continuity of the functions of τi. To solve
this problem, I define
τi(s
t) = τ̄ · (−1)Bi(st). (2.24)
In this way, the function is again differentiable and a perturbation approach produces a meaning-
ful result. This setup has the additional welcome property that excessive asset trade is punished
more the higher the already built-up bond position.
2.3.5 Definition of Equilibrium




t), p(st) and rx(st) for all st and all
t > 0, such that, given an exogenous capital control τ̄
1. all agents solve their optimal consumption, labour, investment and portfolio choice prob-
lems, subject to budget constraints and




t) = 0 (2.25)
B1(s
t, st+1) +B2(s
t, st+1) = 0 ∀st+1 ∈ S (2.26)
for the bond economies and complete markets models, respectively.
2.4 Calibration
For the baseline scenario, I choose a calibration roughly reflecting properties of an emerging
market economy. The discount factor β is set to 0.99, as is standard for a quarterly model. The
weight on labour φ is calibrated to 7.3, so the hours worked are equal to 1/3 in steady state. As
mentioned above, γ, the curvature of the utility function, is set to 1, giving utility a logarithmic
form. Moreover, the Frisch elasticity ε is set to 1 as well. Following Heathcote and Perri (2013),
I set θ, the share of GDP going to capital, to 36 percent and the depreciation rate δ to 0.015.
In the baseline scenario, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign intermediate
inputs, σ, is set to 1. Consequently, the technology of final goods producing firms becomes Cobb-
Douglas. The import share, which is negatively related to the home-bias parameter ω, is set to
is = 0.25, indicating a home bias in the production of final goods.8 This corresponds to values
found in empirical studies (Lewis, 1999).






Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Preferences
Discount factor β = 0.99
Uzawa factor α = 0 (alternatively 0.01)
Weight on labour φ = 7.3
Curvature γ = 1
Frisch Elasticity ε = 1
Country size
Country 1 L1 = 1 (alternatively 1.5 and 2)
Country 2 L2 = 1
Technology
Capital’s share θ = 0.36
Depreciation rate δ = 0.015
Elasticity of substitution σ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}
Import share is ∈ {0.15, 0.25}
Productivity process
Persistence ρ = 0.995
Variance σ2ε = 0.02 (alternatively 0.07)
Correlation Corrε1,ε2 = 0.38
The calibration for the productivity process is identical to Heathcote and Perri (2014). The
persistence of shocks is set to ρ = 0.995, the variance of innovations is set to σ2ε = 0.02 and the
correlation of innovations Corrε1,ε2 = 0.38. As Heathcote and Perri point out, the values for
the variation and correlation of shocks are consistent with estimates for developing economies,
as shown for example in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
Moving away from the baseline calibration, I will analyse the effect of varying both the
import share and the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the final goods production
process. On the import share, the extended calibrations will look at is = 0.25 and is = 0.15.
Whereas an import share of 25% is representative of emerging economies such as China, Russia,
Indonesia and Bangladesh, an import share of around 15% is found in countries such as Nigeria,
Argentina and Brazil (World Bank, 2015). Both values hence help to simulate the model close
to real-world emerging markets.
The bulk of the analysis will focus on two identically large countries (Li = 1 for i = 1, 2) to
showcase underlying mechanisms as clearly as possible. For robustness checks on the extended
version of the model, I will first calibrate the size of Country 1 to Li = 1.5, whilst normalising
Country 2’s size to 1. Finally, I will specify the size of Country 1 to be twice the size of Country
2.
A parameter that caused controversy in the literature is the elasticity of substitution for
traded goods. Whilst this paper does not want to take a stance as to which particular value
might be “correct”, it seems crucial to a well-founded analysis to take into account all values
that are likely to have external validity. For this purpose, I investigate a parameter span between
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σ = 0.1 and 2, as supported, amongst others, by Hooper et al. (2000), who reports a short-run
trade elasticity of 0.6 for the US and values between 0 and 0.6 for the remaining G7 countries, or
Taylor (1993), who finds a short-run trade elasticity of 0.22. As shown in Corsetti et al. (2008),
in response to shocks, the terms of trade will exhibit small positive and negative reactions at the
upper and lower end of the calibration, respectively, whilst featuring very large reactions, both
positive and negative, for intermediate values. Given that the model dynamics so fundamentally
change with the parameterisation of σ, it seems crucial both from a theoretical as well as policy
perspective to extend the analysis of capital controls in that respect. To my knowledge, no
earlier paper has done so.
2.5 Computation
In the complete markets (CM) benchmark case, the welfare theorems and assumed functional
forms allow to solve for the planning problem instead of the decentralised equilibrium. In
particular, this is expressed in an intertemporal risk sharing condition for a and b (see Appendix
A for all equilibrium conditions). For the financial autarky (FA) and bond economy (BE) setting,
it is necessary to solve for the decentralised equilibrium and prices explicitly. In the former case
the modified budget constraints together with Walras’ Law will ensure that markets clear. For
the BE, however, an additional intertemporal Euler equation for bonds needs to be introduced.
As differences in welfare between the models are by nature very small, it becomes fundamen-
tal to increase the precision of the result through a higher-order approximation. More specifically,
I solve the baseline calibration by performing 3rd order local approximations around the non-
stochastic steady state, using the software platform DYNARE. The third order approximation
captures not only the effect of uncertainty on optimal choice, but also how this effect changes
with the level of state variables. Given the assumptions made about preferences, agents in the
model exhibit a precautionary savings motive. However, as the agents’ wealth increases with
their bond position, the motive for further precautionary savings is reduced.9 Under baseline
parameter values, these effects are strong enough to close the model and consequently produce
a stable bond position. Moving away from the baseline calibration, however, some terms in
the approximation become explosive and overpower the stabilising effects mentioned above. I
implement two solutions to overcome this problem. Firstly, as suggested in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003) and Bodenstein (2011), the model is augmented with endogenous discount factors,
also known as Uzawa preferences, after Uzawa (1968). Specifically, the discount factors will be
defined as
βi(s
t) = β̄ · ci(st)−α, (2.27)
9This corresponds to a decreasing coefficient of absolute risk aversion, defined as RA = −u
′′(c)
u′(c) . This is given





where α > 0 determines the weight of consumption in the discount factor and is calibrated to
0.01, whilst β̄ is calibrated so that βi equals 0.99 in steady state. In effect, the more an agent
consumes (i.e. the richer she is), the more impatient she becomes, driving down her savings (i.e.
her bond position). As pointed out in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), this modification makes
the steady state independent of initial conditions while at the same time preserving comovements
of macroeconomic aggregates from the baseline model.
Secondly, I adopt the solution proposed by Andreasen et al. (2013) of systematically pruning
the state space. Put simply, this means removing terms in the solution that have higher-order
effects than the approximation order. Doing so ensures that simulation paths do not explode.
That said, pruning also removes higher order terms that help to equilibrate the model. It is in
connection to this issue that Uzawa preferences restore equilibrium by providing a substitute
for equilibrating terms that were removed under pruning.
This first application of pruning in an open economy macroeconomics setting has shown to
be very promising. At the same time, a host of questions about the exact workings at play were
thrown up, which soon outgrew the scope of this paper and have become the subject of separate
ongoing study.
To compare welfare across models with and without capital controls, I employ a consumption
equivalent measure similar to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). In other words, I ask what
percentage of permanent increase in consumption under one regime would bring welfare to the
same level as in the other. I denote the welfare associated with a bond economy without capital
controls by the expected lifetime utility in period 0, when the economy is in it’s non-stochastic
steady state:






Similarly, defining the welfare of a model with capital controls by






we can compare the different results of welfare using a Lucas-style measure for consumption
equivalence. I denote with ωi the welfare gain of moving from the unrestricted bond economy to
a system with capital controls. Defining ωi as a fraction of consumption, we can write lifetime
utility under capital controls (CC) as









Using the functional form of utility, we get
































Solving for ωi yields
ωi = exp[(1− β)(V CCi0 − V BEi0 )]− 1. (2.32)
It is important to emphasise that for this approach to deliver a sensible result, both welfare
measures have to be computed starting from the non-stochastic steady state, with identical
stocks of capital and an identical bond position.
2.6 Results
The imposition of capital controls has a significant effect on allocative efficiency and risk sharing
between countries. As capital wants to be employed where its marginal product is highest,
restricting capital movement can only have a negative effect on allocative efficiency. Risk sharing,
on the other hand, can go both ways. The main interest of this section will be to see whether a
positive effect from risk sharing can ever outweigh the loss from a less efficient allocation.
2.6.1 Symmetric Countries
Welfare gains from imposing Financial Autarky
σ = 0.5 σ = 1 σ = 1.5 σ = 2
is = 0.25 0.060 -0.006 -0.018 -0.029
is = 0.15 0.108 -0.016 -0.014 -0.033
Table 2.2: Welfare gains calculated relative to bond economy, as % of consumption; un-pruned
solution, standard preferences. is = import share, σ = elasticity of substitution between traded
goods.
Table 2.2 shows the welfare gains of moving from the bond economy to complete financial
autarky, results that are in line with those in Heathcote and Perri (2014). As can be seen,
for the benchmark calibration with a unitary elasticity of substitution (σ = 1) and a 25%
import share, imposing financial autarky leads to a loss in welfare equal to 0.006% of permanent
consumption. What is the underlying mechanism? After a positive shock to productivity in
Country 1, firms in the country want to expand their production capacity to make use of the
higher productivity. Under the bond economy, they borrow from abroad to drive up investment
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(see figure 2.1). As output for good a goes up, its price goes down and the terms of trade
deteriorate (by definition, an increase in the terms of trade is bad for Country 1, but in favour
of Country 2). Overall, demand shifts from good b to good a, allowing Country 2 to produce
relatively less of good b. At the same time, the increase in the price of b increases the country’s
income, shifting some of the benefits from the increase in Country 1’s productivity to Country
2. Overall, the possibility to borrow from abroad makes it possible to increase production where
productivity is highest - an improvement in allocative efficiency - whilst the movement in the
terms of trade distributes the gains across countries.
Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation shock in Country 1’s productivity.
σ = 1, import share = 25%.
By imposing financial autarky, these positive effects are dampened, leading to a Pareto
inferior outcome. Investment still increases in Country 1, but not as much as would be efficient.
At the same time, the movement in the terms of trade is dampened, leading to a loss of cross-
border insurance.
It is worth noting that this loss of cross-border insurance would benefit the country that
has experienced the positive shock, as it could retain a larger share of the rise in output. This
explains why a country might want to unilaterally impose capital controls after a positive shock
has occurred. In other words, through the imposition of capital controls, domestic firms wouldn’t
be able to borrow from abroad and the build-up in production capacity would be less extensive.
Overall, the country could sell its products at a higher price and, like a monopolist, maximise
its rent. From an ex-ante perspective, however, no country knows whether it will be hit by
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a positive or a negative shock and, at least for σ = 1, would prefer to keep capital markets
unrestrained.
Pareto Improving Capital Controls
The result of the welfare comparison is fundamentally different when looking at the calibration
with a lower elasticity of substitution of σ = 0.5. In fact, both countries would prefer to agree on
capital controls of the strictest form before any shocks occur, with welfare improving by 0.06%
of consumption over an agent’s lifetime for the case of a 25% import share, and 0.108% at a
15% import share. From a welfare perspective, the loss in allocative efficiency is outweighed by
an even greater gain in risk sharing. It is worth taking a closer look at the exact mechanism
behind this.
Figure 2.2: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation shock in Country 1’s productivity.
σ = 0.5, import share = 25%.
As in the case above, a positive shock in productivity leads to an increase in investment
(see figure 2.2). In a bond economy, agents borrow from abroad to invest even more. They
do so without internalising that collectively this has an effect on prices. In fact, due to the
low elasticity, the terms of trade worsen so much for the country with the positive shock that
it ends up with lower welfare than before the shock. Without home bias, the agents from the
other country would switch to the now cheaper good and prop prices back up. With home bias,
as specified, however, agents in the other country do not buy much more of the cheaper good
despite the fall in prices. If we associate the movements in the terms of trade with insurance,
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this calibration would exemplify a typical case of overinsurance. The movements in the terms
of trade are higher under the bond economy than under financial autarky. By imposing capital
controls, the ability of agents to borrow from abroad is limited and overinvestment dampened.
The top left panel of figure 2.2 shows investment in Country 1 cut roughly by half in the first
periods after the shock. The resulting movement in the terms of trade is curbed10 which in turn
reduces the volatility of consumption and utility. How decisive movements in the terms of trade
are for the position of a country can also be seen by looking at the absolute level of investment
in the two countries. As depicted in the two top panels in figure 2.2, the movement in the terms
of trade put Country 2 in such a strong position that it can afford a higher level of investment
than Country 1, despite the latter having undergone a positive shock.
Discontinuity of Terms of Trade Reaction
Figure 2.3: Schematic terms of trade response to a productivity shock in Country 1, as a function
of trade elasticity σ in financial autarky.
In the cases mentioned above, a positive shock in productivity is followed by a deterioration
in the terms of trade. Importantly however, this is not a general result, as demonstrated in
Corsetti et al. (2008). Figure 2.3 schematically shows how the impact response of the terms of
trade to a shock changes for different values of the trade elasticity. Specifically, it shows how
the terms of trade reaction becomes continually larger as the trade elasticity becomes smaller,
until, at point σ(ToT ), the response is non-monotonic, switches sign and approaches 0 from
below (see Appendix B for an approach for finding σ(ToT ) analytically). The logic is that for
10Strictly speaking, the integral under the impulse response function for the terms of trade is smaller under FA
than BE (see bottom left panel in figure 2.2).
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very low elasticities, a rise in the terms of trade (i.e. a fall in the price of the relatively more
abundant good) can no longer be an equilibrium solution, as demand from foreign consumers
does not rise enough to match supply. For markets to clear, domestic demand must absorb the
excess supply. This only happens if domestic income rises enough to do so. The only way for
this to happen is through a favourable move in the terms of trade. Consequently, the terms of
trade response switches sign. How does this affect the results?
Welfare gains from imposing Financial Autarky
σ = 0.1 σ = 0.2 σ = 0.3 σ = 0.4 σ = 0.5
is = 0.25 3.714 no sol. 3.693 0.000 -0.038
is = 0.15 0.120 0.410 4.272 no sol. 0.0413
Table 2.3: Welfare gains calculated relative to bond economy, as % of consumption; pruned
solution, Uzawa preferences. is = import share, σ = elasticity of substitution between traded
goods.
As mentioned above, the explosive behaviour of the terms of trade make it impossible to
find a stable solution for low elasticities in the textbook model. However, combining a pruning
algorithm and Uzawa preferences allows to contain the explosive behaviour to some degree,
giving solutions for a much wider range of parameters. Looking at the welfare comparisons in
Table 2.3, a number of things are of note.
Firstly, the changed model and computational technique gives slightly different results from
a quantitative point of view. At σ = 0.5 and is = 0.25, for example, this model shows a welfare
loss of imposing capital controls, whereas the textbook model produced small gains. That said
the underlying mechanisms and model behaviour are unchanged.
Secondly, the larger the absolute movement in the terms of trade, the larger the potential
welfare gains from the imposition of capital controls. Moving from right to left (both in Figure 2.3
and Table 2.3) welfare gains increase as the terms of trade reaction gets larger. At σ(ToT ), the
model does not have a solution. For an import share of 25%, this is the case in the neighbourhood
of σ = 0.2, whereas it is around σ = 0.4 for an import share of 15%. Further to the left, where
the reaction of the terms of trade is negative, welfare gains are large, but diminish as the terms
of trade reaction approaches zero. Interestingly, however, it remains positive until the lowest
level for which the model can be solved computationally.
To better understand the mechanisms at play, I will take a closer look at a calibration below
σ(ToT ), namely σ = 0.1, is = 0.25. Figure 2.5 shows that under a bond economy, a positive
productivity shock in Country 1 makes the country richer through an improvement in the terms
of trade. The flip side is that Country 2 undergoes significant cuts in its income. In fact, the drop
for Country 2 is so large that in the bond economy agents start borrowing funds from Country
1 by selling bonds to dampen the fall in income. By doing so, they pile up a large negative bond
position, worsening the country’s long-term prospects. More importantly, Country 1 can only
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation shock in Country 1’s productivity.
σ = 0.1, import share = 25%.
become a lender if its income rises even more, i.e. if the terms of trade appreciate even more.
Hence, far from helping to share risks across borders, asset trade in fact amplifies them. Moving
to financial autarky, the terms of trade remain contained, and so does investment, output and
relative consumption (see figure 2.5). Simulating the economy for a length of one million periods
shows that the consumption variance under FA is only half the variance under BE. The variance
of the return on capital investments is four times larger under BE than FA whilst the variance
in the hours worked is ten times as large under BE than FA.
Looking at this from a slightly different angle, the question arises why Country 1 doesn’t
borrow from abroad to make more use of its increased productivity? Critically, if Country 1
did indeed borrow, i.e. incur a current account deficit, the terms of trade would not have to
appreciate as much as they do. The boost in income from a smaller appreciation, together with
funds from abroad would be enough to absorb excess supply of good a. However, with a smaller
appreciation of the terms of trade, the output produced in Country 1 looses in value, destroying
the incentive to invest in the production capacity of Country 1 in the first place. Borrowing
from abroad consequently cannot be an equilibrium solution.
In summary, it becomes clear that once the possibility of lower trade elasticities is accepted,
a vast scope for policy intervention opens up in the regions where gains from the imposition of
capital controls may be large. Moreover, in areas close to σ(ToT ), where the model exhibits
explosive phenomena, the results call for policy intervention to anchor the system in a preferred
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location either above or below σ(ToT ).
Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation shock in Country 1’s productivity.
σ = 0.1, import share = 25%.
2.6.2 Continuous Capital Controls
So far, I have modelled capital controls as a complete shut-down in all asset trade. Although
allowing for a clear-cut analysis, this might not be the best measure to look at. For one, capital
controls come in many different forms in reality and only rarely as a complete shut-down in
cross-border asset trade. Moreover, looking only at financial autarky might prevent insights
on the possible magnitude in welfare gains from capital controls. As explained above, capital
controls can cause a Pareto improvement, when asset trade under a bond economy is inefficiently
high. It would consequently be intuitive to think that asset trade would optimally be dampened
to an optimal level—but not cut off completely. Similar to a Laffer curve, the highest welfare
gains would then lie somewhere between financial autarky and the bond economy. Interestingly,
the results suggest otherwise.
Table 2.4 presents the welfare gains of imposing financial autarky for two representative
calibrations of the trade elasticity, σ = 0.5 > σ(ToT ) and σ = 0.1 < σ(ToT ), given import
shares of either 25% or 15%. Going across each row from left to right, the tax on bond returns
increases from τ̄ = 0 (BE) to τ̄ = 0.1. As can be seen immediately, imposing financial autarky
leads to a welfare gain in every case.11 In other words, no intermediate solution Pareto-dominates
11Results show up as 0.000 due to rounding. All entries in Table 2.4 are strictly positive.
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Welfare gains from imposing Financial Autarky
σ = 0.5* τ̄ = 0 (BE) τ̄ = 0.0001 τ̄ = 0.001 τ̄ = 0.01 τ̄ = 0.1 τ̄ = 0.5 τ̄ = 1
is = 0.25 0.060 0.043 0.022 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000
is = 0.15 0.108 0.087 0.046 0.028 0.007 0.002 0.001
σ = 0.1**
is = 0.25 3.714 3.328 1.978 0.574 0.101 0.026 0.014
is = 0.15 0.120 0.104 0.055 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000
Table 2.4: Welfare gains calculated relative to bond economy with taxes as stated, as % of
consumption; *unpruned solution, standard preferences; **pruned solution, Uzawa preferences.
is = import share, σ = trade elasticity, τ̄ = constant component of tax rate.
a complete shut-down in asset trade. Taking a closer look, the higher the imposed tax, the
smaller the welfare gain of imposing financial autarky. Increasing taxes leads to a step by step
reduction in bond trade, converging towards financial autarky and thus the welfare level under
financial autarky. This can also be seen in figure 2.6, where the imposition of taxes results in
IRFs approaching financial autarky step by step but never breaking out of the band created by
FA and BE.
Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation shock in Country 1’s productivity.
σ = 0.5, import share = 25%.
How can it be explained that even a small amount of asset trade is inferior to no asset trade?
Firstly, by acknowledging that the tempting first conclusion of “no asset trade is better than
some asset trade” needs an essential qualification. To the point, no asset trade is better than
asset trade in the direction given by the BE equilibrium. As seen in Figure 2.6, at is = 0.25 and
σ = 0.5, Country 1 enters a current account deficit by selling bonds to Country 2. Given the
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above results, this flow in assets is not only inefficiently large, but actually going in the “wrong”
direction.
This also explains, why a tax cannot improve upon financial autarky in the presented cases.
Whilst taxes and tariffs can weaken or strengthen certain behavioural outcomes, they can not
change their sign.
2.6.3 Asymmetric Countries
Up to this point, all calculations have been made with a calibration that produces two sym-
metrical countries. Whilst this is another step taken to simplify the exposition of underlying
mechanisms, an empirically relevant analysis not only has to acknowledge the presence of coun-
try differences, but also check the robustness of its results in this respect. In what follows, I
recalibrate the model twice. In the first instance, Country 1 takes on a size 1.5 times as large
as Country 2. In the second instance, Country 1 is twice as large as Country 2.
Welfare gains from imposing financial autarky






























Table 2.5: Welfare gains calculated relative to bond economy, as % of consumption, with Country
1 being 1.5 times (L=1.5) or 2 times (L=2) the size of Country 2; *pruned solution, Uzawa
preferences; **unpruned solution, standard preferences.
As the two countries behave differently in an asymmetric setup, Table 2.5 presents the welfare
gains of imposing financial autarky separately for each country. The top panel shows results with
Country 1 being 1.5 times the size of Country 2, the bottom panel shows results for Country
1 being twice the size. For most calibrations, there is one country that clearly benefits from
the imposition of capital controls. More importantly, however, there is no case in which both
countries benefit from the introduction of capital controls. Put differently, there is no case where
both countries would ex-ante agree to the introduction of capital controls. They never cause a
Pareto improvement.
This result once again underlines that utmost caution is called for in dealing with capital
controls and welfare comparisons. Whilst Pareto improvements could be substantial under a
symmetric setup, the more realistic case of differing country sizes makes Pareto improvements
seemingly much less plausible. It has to be added, that the results presented in Table 2.5 only
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show a small selection of possible calibrations and there might be others where both countries
experience an improvement through capital controls. In fact, taking a symmetric calibration
where FA is Pareto superior to BE and infinitesimally changing country sizes still results in
a Pareto improvement, showing that asymmetry and Pareto improvements are not mutually
exclusive at all. Nonetheless, the results indicate that for significant differences in country size,
improvements may be impossible to achieve.
This result extends not only to asymmetry in size, but also in business cycle characteristics.
In particular, I simulated the interaction between a large developed country and a small emerging
country by adjusting business cycle volatilities to empirically observed values. Whilst I specified
the variance of innovations in the emerging country to σ2ε = 0.02, it was set to a significantly
lower σ2ε = 0.007 for the developed country. Rerunning the above cases for this scenario produced
results that were identical in every aspect except the exact magnitudes.
Finally, when looking at overall welfare for asymmetric countries, the result is mixed. Sum-
ming up welfare and weighting each country by its respective size results in an overall welfare
gain in some cases, whereas others report a loss.
2.7 Conclusion
Using a two-country, two-good BKK framework, this paper has shed light on some of the welfare
effects of capital controls. The analysis has produced three economic and one computational
result.
Firstly, welfare effects are dominated by changing movements in the terms of trade across
different trade elasticities. Not only do potential welfare gains from the imposition of capital
controls grow as the terms of trade reaction to shocks grows, but also does the model behaviour
fundamentally change for very low trade elasticities. All this points to potentially significant
Pareto improvements through the imposition of capital controls.
Secondly, a moderate version of capital controls in the form of a tax on bond returns does
not improve upon the welfare results under financial autarky. This indicates that in cases where
capital controls can cause a Pareto improvement, market imperfections guide asset flows in the
wrong direction. As a tax can only increase or decrease the volume of asset trade but not reverse
flows, the best that can be done is a complete shut-down in bond trade.
Thirdly, with countries of significantly different size, introducing capital controls produces
winners and losers. For all parametrisations solved in the course of the presented research,
at least one country was clearly worse off from the imposition of financial autarky, making
Pareto improvements impossible. This is a clear call for caution, showing that the robustness of
Pareto-improving capital controls hinges crucially on assumptions about country size.
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On a computational level, the paper has uncovered the powerful union of Uzawa preferences
and pruning for solving problems related to explosiveness or lack of stationarity in macroeco-
nomic models. Whilst the results were very promising, a host of questions was identified about
the exact workings at play. Answering these questions took on a life of its own, with the aim of
generalising the methods for a wider set of international macroeconomics applications.
On a general level, the results have shown that for certain parametrisations, countries would
prefer to shut down bond trading ex-ante and thus increase cross-border risk sharing. In par-
ticular, the results have shown that the automatic insurance provided through terms of trade
movements can be excessive in the face of pecuniary externalities. As agents overinvest follow-
ing a productivity shock, the reaction of the terms of trade can be so large that the gain in
productive efficiency is outweighed by a loss in risk sharing between the countries. When this
is the case, imposing capital controls can result in a Pareto superior outcome.
Going beyond earlier research, this paper takes into account that the reaction of the terms of
trade is discontinuous and non-monotonic over different intertemporal trade elasticities. Specif-
ically, for low elasticities the impact response of the terms of trade to a productivity shock
changes sign. Looking at the area of parametrisations where this is the case, the results indicate
that welfare always improves when imposing financial autarky compared to a bond economy.
As shown in De Paoli and Lipinska (2013), models without productive capital do not feature
the possibility for Pareto-improving capital controls. Going forward, it would be informative
to further explore the exact role of (productive) capital and capital controls. In particular,
(productive) capital was restricted in the above model as agents were only allowed to invest in
their own country—even though the concept of capital controls did not touch productive capital.
A valid point for further investigation would thus open up by looking at a model that allows
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B Finding σ(ToT )
Log-linearising the set of model equations, one can show that the deviation of the terms of trade
from steady state under financial autarky are given by
p̂ =
ŷ1 − ŷ2
1 + 2s(σ − 1) (44)
where x̂ denotes the percentage deviation of variable x from its steady-state value and s is
defined as the share of locally produced intermediate goods in the final goods production.
It follows that, given a positive shock to output in Country 1, the function changes sign at
σ(ToT ) = 1− 1
2s
. (45)
For the general case of a BE, movements in the terms of trade are given by
p̂ =
1
1 + 2s(σ − 1)
(2s− 1
1− s × nx+ ŷ1 − ŷ2
)
. (46)
In steady state, the relationship between s and the home-bias parameter omega is given by
s =
ωσ




Bridging Fundamental and Market
Sentiment Approaches in Emerging
Market Currency Valuation
3.1 Introduction
Predicting exchange rate movements is notoriously difficult. Famously, Meese and Rogoff (1983a)
established the result that a random walk outperforms forecasts based on economic models of
exchange rates. Ever since, contributions to the literature have proposed models that could
improve on the random walk when tested out of sample. As the more recent overview by Rogoff
(2001) asserts, the original result remains largely untouched. A notable exception comes in the
form of very long-horizon forecasts out to three to four years, which can do significantly better
than the random walk, as shown prominently in Mark (1995), amongst others.
This leaves the question of how to progress on the short and medium end of the forecasting
horizon. As pointed out in detail in Section 3.2, countless contributions to the literature have
taken steps in this direction. Yet despite improving our understanding of the behaviour of
exchange rates, the proposed models seem to suffer from three marked deficiencies when applied
out of sample. Firstly, many models are highly sensitive to the sample period and produce
unsatisfying results once earlier or later periods are taken into account. Secondly, many applied
exchange rate forecasts seem to be based on an arbitrary selection of explanatory variables,
justified by the finding that “they work”. Anecdotal evidence suggests a particular prevalence
of this type of model construction in the FX research departments of investment banks, where
different currencies are often forecast using completely different sets of explanatory variables such
as commodities, equities, CDS spreads, yield curves and others. While each of these variables
may justifiably form part of a forecast, using a different set of variables for each currency reduces
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the generality and appeal of an approach. Lastly, a number of technically more sophisticated
forecasting approaches, e.g. models built on the factor model approach of Engel et al. (2012),
have a tendency to obscure the exact composition of a given forecast. Put differently, when
a forecast is generated not only to mechanically invest, but also to provide information on the
nature and behaviour of a currency, then having a black-box mechanism can obscure the insights
a researcher wishes to gain.
This paper assesses whether we can correctly forecast exchange rate excess returns over
the short-horizon by combining the literature on fundamental exchange rate forecasting with
non-fundamental and market-sentiment oriented approaches. In doing so, we aim to address
the shortcomings mentioned above. Concretely, we construct a model that employs a uniform
methodology across a sample of 20 emerging market currencies. The model not only applies the
same approach across all countries, but also leaves room for the data to speak for itself when it
comes to deciding how important certain building blocks of the model are and in which manner
they influence the forecast. This allows the model to adapt to changing market circumstances
while at the same time minimising arbitrary choices of the forecaster. Concerning the exact
econometric specification, we decide to choose data that allows the use of the simple yet powerful
panel OLS. In doing so, the output of the model remains straightforward to interpret, giving
the researcher not only a signal on which to base a trade, but also a host of information on the
state of the currency and its dynamics.
The main innovation of the paper lies in bridging existing strands on currency forecasting.
Based on the observation in Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) that it is necessary to take into ac-
count both fundamental and non-fundamental aspects when making informed decisions about
currencies, we build a model that includes both from the start. A first step in this direction
has been taken by Jorda and Taylor (2009), but the remarkable majority of models still treat
fundamental and non-fundamental approaches as separate. While it can be useful for an investor
to have different sets of forecasts based on different approaches, this poses the problem of how
to weight them when making an investment decision. Our model overcomes this problem by
producing only one forecast based on a combination of the different approaches.
Concretely, we include four main building blocks. Firstly, a measure of real exchange rate
strength captures fundamental value in the model and gives it traction in the long run. Secondly,
the model captures shorter-term dynamics by including the nominal interest rate differential—of
particular importance due to the prevalence of currency carry trades. Thirdly, the model falls
back on contributions about the interplay of equity markets and currencies, as well as technical
analysis, by including local equity returns. This measure in itself bridges technical concepts such
as “momentum” and “reversal” with the fundamental buying and selling of foreign currencies
to invest in foreign equity. Lastly, our model includes a measure of economic surprises to cover
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local market sentiment in the very short-run.
While remaining parsimonious, the model thus bridges a variety of modelling approaches
and builds on insights from various strands of the literature developed over past decades.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the existing
literature. Section 3.3 describes a theoretical background for modelling currency risk premia,
while Section 3.4 presents the model itself. Additional results and robustness are addressed in
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
It is safe to assume that efforts were made to understand currency value and exchange rates,
in one form or another, since the inception of internationally used currencies. That said, most
current research builds on a number of seminal contributions from the second half of the 20th
and the beginning of the 21st century. In fact, the field has seen an enormous proliferation of
research in the last decades, creating a diverse landscape of models and methodologies. For the
purpose of this paper, we decide to give an overview only of those branches of the literature
which are of immediate relevance to the presented research,1 namely, fundamental exchange rate
determination and more recent technical and sentiment-driven approaches to exchange rates.
For fundamental exchange rate research, the nihilistic paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983a)
provided an era-defining contribution, stating that exchange rate forecasts could not beat a
random walk prediction. The fundamental or “value” models in question would typically try
to predict future exchange rate movements on the basis of economic and monetary fundamen-
tals, such as current account imbalances or real exchange rate misalignments. Contributions
in the following decades largely confirmed the result of Meese and Rogoff, with one significant
exception. Mark (1995) added the crucial qualification that models seem to outperform the
random walk at very long horizons of more than three years. Despite this qualification, the
general mood in the field remained depressed, as expressed, for example, by Sarno and Taylor
(2002): “[E]mpirical work on exchange rates still has not produced models that are sufficiently
statistically satisfactory to be considered reliable and robust”. More recently, this sentiment
was directly addressed by Engel et al. (2008) with the telling title “Exchange Rate Models Are
Not As Bad As You Think”. Rather than proposing a distinct new model, however, the authors
argue that “beating a random walk” is too strong a criterion in evaluating forecasts and show
that out-of-sample forecasting power can be increased with panel estimation as well as by fo-
cusing on long-horizon forecasts. This leaves, as Rogoff (2008) puts it, “the big challenge: one
month to one year horizons”.
1For a broader overview on exchange rate research, the interested reader is guided to James et al. (2012).
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As an alternative to fundamental or value models, the long-standing strand of the literature
termed “technical analysis” uses a currency’s own past movements to predict future returns in
a rule-based manner. As summarised in Pring (1991), technical analysis attempts to profit from
systematic changes in the psychology of the market. In their review of technical analysis in
currency markets, Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) document that technical analysis is widespread
and continually used, but that it remains unclear whether the realisation of profits from technical
analysis stems from incurring large risks which might not be fully compensated for.
A third strand of the literature of relevance to our analysis focuses on the widespread ap-
plication of “carry trade” strategies and their implications on exchange rates. Based on the
empirical observation that high-yielding currencies often do not depreciate as predicted by un-
covered interest parity theory, carry strategies generate returns by borrowing in low interest
rate currencies and investing in high interest rate currencies. Burnside et al. (2011a) argue that
so-called Peso problems, i.e. low probability events that do not occur in the sample, explain
these returns, even when negative payoffs during Peso periods are not very large. More recently,
Koijen et al. (2016) show that although other known predictors of returns do not explain carry,
the latter captures a number of known predictors from different asset classes, making it useful
to the prediction of future prices.
Realising the potential of combining some of these strands, Jorda and Taylor (2009) take
a first step in creating a model that combines the carry trade with a fundamental approach.
Specifically the authors condition their model’s carry trade recommendations on fundamental
equilibrium exchange rates (FEERs), achieving better returns as measured by Sharpe ratios and
skewness when forecasting currencies for nine developed countries out of sample.
Finally, a number of contributions have realised the potential to increase model performance
by building currency portfolios instead of forecasting bilateral exchange rates independently.
Examples include Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Lustig et al. (2011), Menkhoff et al. (2011) and
Menkhoff et al. (2016).
3.3 Theoretical Background for Modelling Currency Risk Pre-
mia
To set the stage for our empirical analysis, this section introduces the theoretical concept of risk
premia, or expected excess returns.
If St is the nominal exchange rate, defined in units of home currency per unit of foreign
currency, Ft the one-period forward rate, and it+1 and i
∗
t+1 the nominal interest rates at home
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and abroad, then the covered interest parity (CIP) condition ensures that






Moreover, the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition formalises the idea that the return
earned on investments in different currencies should, in expectation, be identical. Algebraically,







where i and i∗ denote the nominal interest rates at home and abroad, respectively, and S is
the nominal exchange rate defined as units of home currency per unit of foreign currency (see
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a textbook analysis of CIP and UIP). The UIP condition implies
that any differences in nominal interest rates are expected to be balanced out by an appreciation
or depreciation in the bilateral exchange rate. The observation that realised exchange rate
movements repeatedly fail to do so is often misinterpreted as a failure of UIP. Note, however,
that the condition describes an ex ante, not an ex post relationship. As described in Jorda
and Taylor (2009), evidence points to ex ante exchange rate expectations not being far out of
line with interest differentials. The problem rather seems to stem from systematically wrong
expectations themselves. Ex post, these drive a wedge into the realised returns of investments
in different currencies.









any deviation of rpt from 1 would indicate a violation of UIP. Ex post, the realised excess return










where the last equality directly follows from the CIP condition 3.1.
Using the definition for the currency risk premium allows us to distinguish between its two
main components: the interest differential and expected changes in the nominal exchange rate
St. We take a closer look at each in turn.
There is a diverse literature looking at the influence of interest rate differentials on the
determination of exchange rates, as emphasised by Engel and West (2010). Our approach here
is mostly definitional. It is evident from the definition of rx that, if the nominal exchange rate
were to stay completely unchanged from one period to the next, the interest rate differential
would constitute the entirety of the risk premium. In the literature, the concept of the income
87
earned from holding an asset if its price stays the same is known as “carry”. Koijen et al. (2016)
note that carry is special in so far as it is a model-free characteristic that is observable ex ante.
This property makes it an indispensable component of any risk premium forecast. Were we to
assume, as is regularly done, that exchange rates follow a random walk, i.e. Et(St+1 − St) = 0
(see e.g. Meese and Singleton (1982) for an early example), then our forecast of the risk premium
would indeed be identical to the interest rate differential. How central the idea of carry is to
applied currency management and trading can also be seen in the prevalence of the “carry
trade”, a strategy solely focussed on capturing returns from interest rate differentials that have
not been neutralised by counteracting nominal depreciations.
In practice, finding reliable data on interest rates at a regular frequency can pose a challenge,
especially for emerging market countries. To calculate the interest rate differential we can,
however, circumvent this problem. From the CIP condition 3.1 it follows that the interest rate
differential can be expressed as the difference between forward and spot prices, both of which







The second main component of the risk premium is given by the change in the nominal
exchange rate St+1St . The literature broadly distinguishes between two approaches to modelling
changes in the exchange rate. The first tries to look at the underlying value of a currency and
consequently focuses on the real exchange rate and its “fair value”. Recent contributions have
shown that the real exchange rate is stationary, implying there is some long-run value to which
it eventually converges. However, this reversal towards the long-run average is very slow with
estimates for the half-life of real exchange rate deviations ranging from 3 to 5 years (Rabanal
and Rubio-Ramirez, 2015). For this reason, the fair value approach is predominantly chosen
to predict exchange rate movements over a long-horizon. Typical examples in practice (such as
Trivedi and Ozerov (2016)) gain traction 4 to 8 quarters out, and become most powerful at 12
to 16 quarters ahead.
In their most basic form, fundamental models base forecasts on deviations from purchasing
power parity (PPP) theory, which states that real exchange rates should equal 1, or at least have
a tendency to revert back to 1 when that long-run ratio is disturbed for some reason (Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1996). As mentioned above, however, these deviations can be very persistent.
Consequently, more differentiated models try to identify which deviations are justified, e.g. by
fundamentals such as productivity growth, and which are not. Examples include models of
fundamental equilibrium exchange rates (FEER) that pin down the level of a currency that is
consistent with achieving both a sustainable current account deficit and output close to potential,
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or so-called behavioural equilibrium exchange rates (BEER) that use fundamentals directly to
estimate the equilibrium level of exchange rates (Clark and MacDonald, 1999).2
The second school of thought in forecasting currency movements builds on the observation
that fundamentals have close to no predictive power over short time horizons, a result first
popularised by Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b). Instead, short-term movements seem to be driven
by investor sentiment and various other manifestations of behavioural anomalies, often in conflict
with the efficient market hypothesis. Amongst the most widely followed strategies are “carry”,
“momentum” and “reversal”. With an extensive literature covering these strategies (and others)
this paper will not analyse them in depth, but rather give a short overview and focus on the
concepts underlying the usefulness of the strategies.
Carry strategies are based on the empirical observation that nominal exchange rates often
do not adjust for interest rate differentials across borders. Borrowing in low-yielding currencies
and investing in currencies with high yields can then leave investors with an excess return.
Burnside et al. (2011a) and Burnside et al. (2011b), amongst others, document the success of
this strategy, but also warn of the property of carry trades to incur large and rapid losses during
times off financial market turmoil. As Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) point out, “high-yielding
currencies are known to ‘go up by the stairs and down by the elevator’, implying that the
carry trade has substantial crash risk”. Nonetheless, carry remains a popular strategy amongst
institutional investors and private individuals alike.3 As mentioned in Section 3.2, Koijen et al.
(2016) show that carry also captures several known return predictors from different asset classes,
implying its usefulness for forecasting.
Momentum strategies are based on empirical observations that periods of currency moves in
one direction are sometimes systematically followed by further moves in the same direction. The
closely related reversal strategies, on the other hand, profit from FX movements that change
direction after a certain period of time. The former is rationalised by a crowding-in behaviour,
where investors seek out currencies that were successful in the past and buy into them leading
to further appreciations. Conversely, the latter strategy can be rationalised with a “cashing-
in” behaviour that leads investors to sell currencies after a period of appreciation to secure
realised profits (see Pring (1991), Neely and Weller (2012), Menkhoff et al. (2011), Burnside
et al. (2011b) and Asness et al. (2013)). Whilst a number of empirical studies come up with suc-
cessful versions of momentum and reversal strategies, they have significant shortcomings. Most
importantly, returns from momentum and reversal strategies display a high degree of sensitivity
2To find a way through the proliferation of acronyms stemming from various approaches—CHEER, ITMEER,
PEER, DEER, FEER and BEER, to name just a few—the interested reader is guided to Driver and Westaway
(2004).
3For an account of the surprising extent to which the carry trade became popular amongst Japanese housewives,
as well as the personal tragedies following episodes during which carry incurred large losses, see Jorda and Taylor
(2009).
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to chosen sample periods and currency pairs. Even though many versions of these strategies
produce positive excess returns over a certain number of years, they then regularly fall victim
to changes in market dynamics, often wiping out all previous gains (see Menkhoff and Taylor
(2007) for an analysis of the question in how far profits are rationalised by large and uncom-
pensated risk). One conclusion to be drawn is that these strategies might not be beneficial on
their own when forecasting exchange rates over prolonged periods of time, but may add useful
information to a more sophisticated model, at least during certain periods. Moreover, to be
convincing not only ex post, but also ex ante, a methodologically appealing setup would apply
the strategy uniformly to all currency pairs and retain a certain level of agnosticism about the
exact time periods and directions involved.
Among the many other forms of behavioural investment strategies, such as looking at investor
flows as in Froot and Ramadorai (2005), of particular importance is the effect of market sentiment
itself. Traditionally, there are currencies which profit from a so-called “risk-on” environment,
such as most emerging market currencies. Other currencies, in particular those known as “safe
havens”, such as the Swiss franc or the Japanese yen, strengthen in times of uncertainty—so-
called “risk-off” episodes. This leads many forecasters to introduce dummies that push forecasts
in one way or another during times of high or low volatility, depending on the “character” of the
currency. This approach is straightforward for currencies such as the Swiss franc, where a broad
consensus exists as to its safe haven status. Such classifications become more difficult for many
other currencies, however, particularly in emerging markets. Intuitively, there are two reasons to
explain this. Firstly, whenever the level of political stability changes, so does the extent to which
a currency is exposed to market turmoil and worldwide volatility. As political stability increases
and decreases at a much higher frequency in emerging markets than in developed markets, cat-
egorisations, even when correct, are less long-lived. Secondly, emerging market currencies react
very differently to different kinds of shocks and volatility. Whereas general USD strength affects
emerging markets across the board, the effects are much more differentiated following shocks
to the oil price and other commodities, to armed conflict or to demand shocks in big economic
powers such as the US or China. Consequently, it is again paramount not to use a certain model
setup that might provide good results in sample, but does not take into account that dynamics
can change quickly, leading to bad forecasts later on.
In what follows, the strategy is to put the fundamental approach at the core of modelling risk
premia. Doing so provides a foundation for prediction accuracy over a long horizon, independent
of day-to-day market turbulence and changes in sentiment. That said, the paper poses itself
the veritable challenge of forecasting risk premia over the short time span of 1 month. This is a
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novelty in the literature on fundamental exchange rate forecasting, which typically sees success
over horizons of 3 to 5 years. To be able to push the boundary of the investment horizon to
such an extent, the paper explores new territory by combining the fundamental approach with
the short-term investment strategies presented above. In particular, the aim is to provide a
framework which is not only completely uniform in how it applies to the chosen currency pairs,
but also remains agnostic about the way in which market sentiment and behavioural aspects
affect the forecast. In this sense, the data is allowed to speak for itself and parameters will have
the opportunity to adapt to changing market circumstances without being arbitrarily restricted
to an approach that “works” in sample.
3.4 The Empirical Model
This section explains in detail which indicators are chosen to form the building blocks of the
model, following the forecasting schools presented above. In particular, we will address the
shortcomings of these schools and how to overcome them.
Fundamental Value: The Real Exchange Rate
Real exchange rate strength builds the fundamental core of our approach, in line with the
established literature on real exchange rate modelling. As mentioned in the section above, one
of the main difficulties lies in identifying real exchange rate deviations that are not justified by
other fundamentals such as productivity growth and hence can be expected to revert in the near
future. To avoid having to impose a way of estimating equilibrium real exchange rate levels
across countries, we choose instead to focus on deviations of a country’s real exchange rate from
its own history. Amongst others, Engel (2016) finds strong evidence of mean reversion in the
real exchange rate, implying that current deviations from the historical mean contain significant
information about future movements, even when leaving aside cross-country comparisons. As
RER deviations correct only very slowly—estimates range from 3 to 5 years (Rabanal and Rubio-
Ramirez, 2015)—we use deviations from the ten-year average. Specifically, we calculate the 10-
year z-score of the CPI-based broad real effective exchange rate constructed by JP Morgan. Using
this measure makes observations from different countries comparable as the z-score corrects
deviations for the general level of volatility in a country’s time series.
Carry: The Interest Rate Differential
Using equation 3.4, we substitute the interest rate differential with the forward premium St/Ft.
Data for both spot and forward rates are readily available for all countries in our sample.
For forward rates, we choose 1-month non-deliverable contracts, corresponding to our forecast
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horizon.
In choosing an intuitively convincing measure of the interest rate differential, the question
arises whether the real interest rate differential might contain more information than the nomi-
nal. We make our choice on the basis of existing analysis which finds a higher information content
in nominal compared to real interest rate differentials when it comes to predicting excess returns
(see The Economist (2013) and references therein).
Momentum: Equity Returns
Momentum and reversal strategies traditionally focus on using the past performance of a cur-
rency to predict its future performance. In line with the more fundamental-oriented approach
of this paper, however, we move away from this purely self-deterministic approach and use past
performance of local equity markets as an explanatory variable for risk premia. This idea is
based on Cenedese et al. (2015), who suggest that the correlation between international equity
returns and currency returns could be positive due to return-chasing by investors. Specifically,
they mention a large literature showing that investors often increase their holdings in markets
that have recently outperformed, a phenomenon termed “trend chasing”. That said, the authors
also mention conflicting evidence pointing towards a negative correlation following the sell-off of
recently successful stocks to repatriate returns. We consequently introduce equity returns in an
agnostic way, allowing for either a positive or negative correlation in our forecasts. Specifically,
we use the 1-month percentage change in the local MSCI equity index for each currency.
Investor Sentiment: The Citi Economic Surprise Index
The final building block of our forecast is given by the Citi Economic Surprise Index (CESI).
Exchange rates are known to react almost instantaneously to announcements of macroeconomic
news, such as new data (see Engel et al. (2008) and references therein). As such, most funda-
mental information is priced into exchange rates straight away. Nonetheless, positive or negative
economic surprises can significantly affect investor sentiment with regards to a certain country
or currency. Current sentiment, in turn, partly determines an investor’s willingness to take on
risk. This effect is particularly dominant in emerging markets, where large capital flows have
been shown to sometimes follow sentiment, rather than fundamentals, not least during times of
currency crises.4 For exchange rate forecasting, this observation implies that economic surprises
potentially contain systematic information about future moves in the exchange rate and risk
premia. The CESI is by construction centred around zero, allowing us to use the index level
directly for our estimation. Specifically, we use the CESI level from the last day of each month.
4See Flood et al. (2012) for a summary on the dynamics of currency crises.
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Before moving on to the next section it is worth stressing again that despite including a large
number of emerging market currencies, our approach is uniform across all countries. For no
currency pair do we modify the number of regressors or how the parameters filter through to the
forecast. This is an important property in the field of exchange rate forecasting, which, especially
in market application, is ridden with traditions of arbitrarily including different regressors for
different currency pairs until the model “works”.
3.4.1 Data
Our sample contains monthly data for 20 emerging market economies: Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. All exchange
rates in the sample are included as bilateral against the US dollar. The chosen currencies
correspond to the most widely traded currencies in emerging markets as reported by the Bank
for International Settlements (2016), with the exception of the Chinese yuan (renminbi), Hong
Kong dollar and Saudi riyal, which we excluded due to their closely managed or pegged nature.
The sample starts at the point in time from which data for the chosen variables exist for all
countries, January 2005, and ends in December 2016.
Bilateral spot exchange rates, 1-month non-deliverable forwards, JP Morgan CPI-based
broad real effective exchange rates and MSCI local equity indices are obtained from Bloomberg,
capturing values at New York close on the last trading day of each month. Data for the month-
end level of Citi Economic Surprise Indices are obtained from Citi.
3.4.2 Estimation
The estimation approach follows three main ideas. Firstly, we want the data to speak for itself
such that sign and size of the coefficients can change over time. We achieve this through an
extending window regression where every new observation is used to re-estimate coefficients for
the following period. Secondly, we try to avoid a “black-box” mechanism at all cost. Looking for
the most intuitive and easy to interpret estimation procedure available, we rely on ordinary least
squares (OLS). As specified in the section above, all our data either naturally fulfil requirements
that make OLS a valid approach, or they have been transformed to do so—e.g. by taking the
z-score to account for the variation in standard deviations across countries. Thirdly, we aim to
estimate parameters robustly despite the short time series available for emerging market data.
We find that a straightforward way of doing so is by pooling our data and thus significantly
increasing the number of observations. Mark and Sul (2012) show that, in this context, pooling
dominates time-series regression when the heterogeneity in model parameters is small. By
restricting our analysis to emerging market currencies that exhibit very similar properties, we
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believe this condition to be met.
We estimate risk premia as
rpi,t+1 = α+ β1reri,t + β2irdi,t + β3emomi,t + β4cesii,t + ui,t, (3.6)
where rp is the risk premium, rer is the real exchange rate z-score, ird is the interest rate
differential, emom is equity momentum, cesi is the Citi Economic Surprise Index and u is the
disturbance.
Table 3.1 shows the regression output from the in-sample period Jan 2005 to Dec 2005,
including 217 observations. Despite the very short sample period, it already becomes clear that
the interest rate differential is crucial to forecasting risk premia. The coefficient is positive and
significant at the 1% confidence level. As expected, real exchange rate strength has a negative
effect, albeit not significant at this stage. Equity returns have a negative coefficient, supporting
the concept of ‘reversal’ while positive economic surprises have a positive coefficient. That said,
again neither of the two is significant in this sample. At 8.9%, the R-squared is unusually high
for a predictive equation of this type, potentially indicating that the interest rate differential
explained an abnormally large amount of risk premia over 2005.
Table 3.1: In-sample estimation of risk premia.
Dependent Variable: risk premium
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2005M01 2005M12
Periods included: 11
Cross-sections included: 20
Total panel(unbalanced) observations: 217
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
c -0.15465 0.18129 -0.85305 0.3946
rer -0.18437 0.140349 -1.31363 0.1904
ird 1.630068*** 0.380886 4.279679 0.0002
emom -0.02804 0.023441 -1.19638 0.2329
cesi 0.002654 0.002089 1.270495 0.2053
R-squared 0.089478 Adjusted R-squared 0.072298
3.4.3 Portfolio Strategy
In the next section we implement portfolio strategies based on the framework presented above.
For the construction of portfolios we follow the literature, in particular Menkhoff et al. (2016).
We construct linear, rank and high-minus-low portfolios, using the forecasts for risk premia as
signals.
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For our benchmark linear portfolio, weights are assigned according to
wj,t+1 = ct(rpj,t+1 − rpt+1), (3.7)




j=1 rpj,t+1 is the cross-sectional average
of estimated risk premia across countries n. The factor ct is constructed such that the sum of
all positive portfolio weights equals one and the sum of all negative portfolio weights equals one.
In other words, the portfolio prescribes to borrow and invest one unit. This not only ensures
comparability of portfolios across different set-ups, but also makes sure that the amount invested
remains constant over time, independent of accumulated profits or losses. Algebraically,
ct =
1∑
j |rpj,t+1 − rpt+1|
. (3.8)






Notably, the linear portfolio preserves all ratios in size between forecasts. In other words,
currencies for which the model predicts extraordinarily large positive or negative risk premia will
feature with an extraordinarily large weight in the portfolio. By definition, it is also possible
(and likely) that the number of positive portfolio weights is unequal the number of negative
portfolio weights.
The rank portfolio, on the other hand, assigns portfolio weights only according to the position
of forecasts in a ranking by size, not by the size of the forecast itself. As in Menkhoff et al.









As with the linear portfolio, the scaling factor ct is constructed such that the portfolio is long
one unit and short one unit of currency. Given the number of currencies in the sample, ct = 0.02,
resulting in weights ranging from -0.19 to 0.19 with an interval size of 0.02. By definition, this
portfolio will always be long 10 currencies and short 10 currencies.
Finally, we construct a high-minus-low portfolio which only trades the two currencies with
the largest and smallest signal. Specifically, the portfolio goes long one unit of the currency with
the largest forecast for the risk premium and shorts one unit of the currency with the smallest
forecast.
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Intuitively, the high-minus-low portfolio allows investments to represent very strong views
about predicted risk premia to the extent, that “all eggs are being put into one basket”. We
expect this approach to display very high mean returns, but also a high degree of volatility,
as investments are not distributed amongst currencies. The rank portfolio, on the other hand,
strongly restricts the model-based formation of a strong view. As mentioned above, the curren-
cies with the strongest signals receive a weight of 0.19 and -0.19, with the strategy ensuring a
smooth distribution of investments across all 20 currencies. Consequently, we would expect re-
turns from this approach to exhibit a relatively low volatility. Conceptually, the linear portfolio
can be seen as a compromise between the rank and high-minus-low portfolios, where the model
is allowed to display conviction whilst still investing in all currencies in the sample.
A property worth pointing out that applies to all three portfolio approaches is that the
sign of the portfolio position for a currency does not have to be the same as the sign of the
forecast. Even if all currencies are forecast to have positive risk premia in the month to come,
the rank portfolio, for example, would short half the currencies, namely those with the smallest
appreciation signals. This also applies to the linear and high-minus-low portfolios, although the
linear portfolio, as mentioned above, does not necessarily equate the number of long and short
positions.
On a general note, portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every month, based on the latest
forecast. Trades are executed by buying (selling) 1-month forward contracts and selling (buying)
spot at expiry. As such, the portfolios are cost-free.5
3.4.4 Benchmark Results
Table 3.2 presents the results for portfolio returns between 2006 and 2016. In particular, it
shows annualised mean returns, t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors,
return volatilities, Sharpe Ratios and hit ratios for linear, rank and high-minus-low portfolios.
Hit ratios are defined as the percentage of periods during which the portfolio produces a positive
return. Remarkably, all portfolios display large positive mean returns. As expected, the high-
minus-low portfolio has the highest annualised mean return at 7.4%. That said, it also displays
the highest standard deviation of returns. Whilst the rank portfolio returns have the lowest
standard deviation, it is the linear portfolio that has the highest Sharpe Ratio at 0.75. Following
the intuitive interpretation above, it seems that the linear portfolio finds the best compromise
between allowing the model to show conviction on certain currencies, whilst still optimising
the benefits of investing in a portfolio of currencies to smooth returns. Hit ratios for all three
portfolios are between 60% and 63%, significantly above the 50% implied by a random walk.




mean 5.05 3.60 7.39
t [2.76] [2.36] [1.96]
ρ 6.59 5.73 13.05
skew -0.23 -0.27 0.16
kurtosis 0.79 0.72 0.62
Sharpe ratio 0.75 0.62 0.55
hit ratio 63% 60% 61%
biggest monthly gain 6.00 5.31 14.23
biggest monthly loss -5.62 -5.02 -8.14
maximum drawdown -11.56 -7.92 -25.78
Table 3.2: This table shows benchmark results for out-of-sample tests of three portfolios from
2006 to 2016. Mean returns, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios are annualised. T-statistics
are calculated based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. The sample includes monthly
data from Jan 2005 to Dec 2016. Out-of-sample results are calculated from Jan 2006 to Dec
2016 with an extending window regression.
Note that our portfolio does not profit from the general success of emerging market currencies
over the sample period as the portfolio is always short EM currencies to the same extent that it
is long other EM currencies.
Figure 3.1 shows cumulative returns as well as drawdowns for the three portfolio strategies.
Cumulative returns are calculated as the percent return on one unit invested in the portfolio.
Seeing that the portfolios are cost free, no ex-ante investment is required. Consequently, cumula-
tive returns start at 0, as opposed to 100%. Looking at the graph, the most surprising feature is
that linear and rank portfolios perform remarkably consistently over the whole sample period—
pre-crisis, post-crisis and during the crisis. In fact, there is only one occurence of 5 months and
one of 4 months of consecutive negative returns in the linear and rank portfolios (May 2015 to
Sep 2015 and Sep 2008 to Dec 2008, respectively). During all other times, consecutive periods of
negative returns are at a maximum three months long. In the high-minus-low portfolio, despite
incurring larger losses during periods of negative returns, they never exceed 4 months in length.
Figure 3.1 again shows very clearly how the commitment to only two currencies in the high-
minus-low portfolio comes with a significant increase in downside risk. Drawdowns, calculated
as cumulative negative returns since the last maximum in cumulative returns, are far larger for
the high-minus-low portfolio compared to the linear and rank portfolios, peaking at over -25%.
Linear and rank portfolios, on the other hand, display a very similar pattern with comparably
small drawdowns of -12% and -8%, respectively, at worst.
To get a better idea of whether portfolios are able to consistently generate positive returns,
we calculate annualised mean returns for every year in the sample period, shown in Figure 3.2.
Two observations stand out. Firstly, there are only very few years with negative returns. For
the linear portfolio, only three out of eleven years show negative returns. For the rank and
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(a) Cumulative excess returns (b) Drawdowns
Figure 3.1: Panel (a) shows cumulative portfolio excess returns (in %) for linear, rank and
high-minus-low strategies. Panel (b) displays drawdown dynamics of the three portfolios.
high-minus-low portfolios this is even lower at two years each. Secondly, negative returns for
both the linear and the rank portfolio are remarkably contained. During 2015, the worst year
for the rank portfolio, annualised average returns stayed above -2.5%. 2014, the worst year
for the linear portfolio, saw average returns of about -1%. Averaging across all three years of
negative returns for the linear portfolio, negative annualised average returns stand at -0.6%.
This compares to average returns of 7.4% during years with positive returns.
3.5 Additional Results and Robustness
After a first look at the results, the model seems to be a powerful tool to forecast risk premia in
emerging market currencies. But as with all models, there are issues that need to be addressed
to establish the robustness of results. We will now cover some of these issues and discuss further
avenues for the estimation of risk premia.
Excluding regressors
One of the most appealing factors of the model is its simplicity and straightforward approach.
Using only four regressors, however, also raises the question whether the model might be overly
dependent on one of them. To get a clearer idea of the influence each regressor has on the fore-
casts, we replicate all estimations and out-of-sample predictions, excluding one of the regressors
at a time.
Table 3.3 presents annualised mean returns, t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987)
standard errors, return volatilities, Sharpe Ratios and hit ratios for linear, rank and high-minus-
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Figure 3.2: Annualised mean excess returns (in %) by year for linear, rank and high-minus-low
portfolio strategies.
excluding rer excluding ird
linear rank HML linear rank HML
mean 4.93 3.63 9.98 3.14 2.56 1.93
t [2.67] [2.37] [2.46] [2.05] [1.94] [0.5]
ρ 6.21 5.33 12.98 5.14 4.68 12.27
SR 0.78 0.67 0.74 0.6 0.54 0.16
hit ratio 61% 60% 62% 55% 57% 53%
excluding emom excluding cesi
linear rank HML linear rank HML
mean 4.71 4.38 4.89 4.49 2.81 9.01
t [2.27] [2.69] [0.57] [2.18] [1.51] [1.82]
ρ 7.1 5.75 15.45 7.15 6.38 14.6
SR 0.65 0.75 0.31 0.61 0.43 0.59
hit ratio 60% 61% 58% 58% 55% 63%
Table 3.3: This table shows results for out-of-sample tests of linear, rank and high-minus-low
portfolios. Compared to the benchmark results in Table 3.2, this table reports results for models
where we remove one explanatory variable at a time. Mean returns, standard deviations and
Sharpe ratios are annualised. T-statistics are calculated based on Newey and West (1987)
standard errors. The sample includes monthly data from Jan 2005 to Dec 2016. Out-of-sample
results are calculated from Jan 2006 to Dec 2016.
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linear rank HML
mean 3.3 3.72 10.87
t [1.16] [1.75] [1.76]
ρ 8.2 6.6 16.67
skew -0.71 -0.26 -0.39
kurtosis 1.69 0.91 1.67
Sharpe ratio 0.4 0.55 0.62
hit ratio 59% 59% 63%
biggest monthly gain 6.48 5.51 14.02
biggest monthly loss -8.25 -6.48 -15.66
maximum drawdown -21.54 -11.88 -54.38
Table 3.4: This table shows out-of-sample results for carry strategies using linear, rank and
high-minus-low portfolios. Mean returns, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios are annualised.
T-statistics are calculated based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. The sample includes
monthly data from Jan 2005 to Dec 2016. Out-of-sample results are calculated from Jan 2006
to Dec 2016.
low portfolios. Reassuringly, in no specification do Sharpe ratios for the linear portfolio drop
below 0.6, indicating that no single building block of the model drives the results. Interestingly,
the Sharpe ratio is even better for the model without real exchange rate strength than for the
full model. Whilst this out-of-sample test indicates that the real exchange rate does not have
much to contribute to the estimation, we find that the theoretical argument for its inclusion
remains overwhelming, even for the short forecast horizon of one month. More generally, from a
methodological perspective we would not want to drop regressors on the basis of out-of-sample
testing, as this would invalidate the approach. All that said, Sharpe ratios are only one method
of evaluating out-of-sample performance, and not an uncontroversial one. Looking for example
at hit ratios instead, we see that the full model outperforms the version excluding the real
exchange rate.
What About the Random Walk - Is Carry The Way To Go?
Traditionally, the benchmark for success in foreign exchange rate forecasting has been the ran-
dom walk. Ever since Meese and Rogoff (1983a) suggested that fundamental forecasts do not do
better than the random walk, horse races have been run against it. As pointed out in Section 3.3,
the random walk hypothesis stipulates that nominal exchange rates are expected to remain un-
changed, implying that risk premia correspond one-for-one to interest rate differentials (carry).
Consequently, by testing our model against the random walk, we implicitly also test whether it
performs better than the classic carry trade. The latter is a relevant question, as many exchange
rate models for emerging market currencies seem to perform well simply because they absorb
the returns to the carry trade. Table 3.4 presents the results for the model based on carry alone.
The standard deviation of returns rises in all three portfolio specifications, whilst mean returns
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Sharpe ratios model carry Z-score
linear 0.75 0.4 1.71*
rank 0.62 0.55 0.29
high-minus-low 0.55 0.62 -0.24
Table 3.5: We compare Sharpe ratios of the benchmark model with those of a carry trade using
a two-sample version of the Jobson and Korkie (1981) test. The null hypothesis for the three
portfolios is that the Sharpe ratios of the benchmark model and of the carry strategy are equal.
The last column of the table shows the Z-score difference between the Sharpe ratios, which is
approximately normally distributed with mean zero and a standard deviation of one. Only the
Z statistic for the linear portfolio is significant (at the 5% level).
fall for both the linear and rank portfolio, leading to a drop in their Sharpe ratios to 0.4 and
0.55, respectively. A rise in mean returns for the high-minus-low portfolio implies a rise in the
Sharpe ratio to 0.62. To get a better understanding of the changes in Sharpe ratios, we test
whether the Sharpe ratios of the full model are statistically different from the Sharpe ratios of
the random walk model. We do so with the two-sample version of the Jobson and Korkie (1981)
test. The test is approximately normally distributed with mean zero and a standard deviation of
one, and has the null-hypothesis of equal risk-adjusted performance in both models. The results,
presented in Table 3.5, show that the linear benchmark model has a significantly higher Sharpe
ratio than the carry strategy and thus beats the random walk. Concretely, the null-hypothesis
is rejected for the linear model at the 5% level. For the rank and high-minus-low portfolios,
however, Sharpe ratios under the benchmark model are not significantly different from carry.
This is partly explained by the low power of the test, as noted in Jobson and Korkie (1981) and
Jorion (1985).
The test leads us to conclude that carry is not driving the results of our benchmark portfolios.
Excluding Currencies
Similar to the question whether individual regressors drive the results, the question arises
whether particular currencies dominate the overall return statistics. To answer this question,
we present annualised average return statistics and hit ratios for all currencies over the three
portfolio strategies, shown in Table 3.6. Note that, by construction, the annualised mean return
of a portfolio is the sum of the mean returns of all 20 currencies displayed in the table. Hit ratios,
on the other hand, do not average to the portfolio hit ratio. In fact, whilst the hit ratio for the
linear portfolio overall is at 63%, hit ratios for individual currencies only range from between
45% and 62%. It can be inferred that while the portfolio is not particularly good at predicting
the direction of each individual currency at every period in time, it is good at assigning higher
weights to currencies where it has a high degree of conviction and thus generates high returns
when the prediction is correct, compared to relatively small losses when it is wrong. In each of
the three portfolios, 8 out of 20 currencies display negative average returns. Figures 3.3, 3.4 and
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3.5 graphically show the dispersion in results. Each portfolio strategy suffers from two currencies
that significantly breach the 1-standard-deviation band across mean returns. Whilst these are
particularly influential in the high-minus-low portfolio, where the Turkish lira (TRY) generates
roughly two-thirds of the overall return, the outliers in the linear and rank portfolios are much
less consequential. The Turkish lira (TRY) and Polish zloty (PLN), the strongest performers in
the linear and rank portfolios, generate less than one-third of the overall portfolio returns.
Note that whilst this analysis sheds light on the consistency of returns across different parts
of the portfolio, we cannot infer what returns would be were we to exclude one of the currencies.
The exclusion of a currency changes weights for all other currencies in the portfolio, leading to












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Annualised mean excess returns (in %) by currency for linear portfolio strategy.
Decomposing The Signal
In constructing the model, we chose to allow for changing coefficients over time. This gives
the model the opportunity to adapt to changing circumstances and relationships. It raises the
question, however, whether the model might behave in an erratic way and react excessively to
short-term changes in the market environment. To gain a better understanding on how exactly
parameters behave, we dive deeper into two aspects of the model. Firstly, we decompose the
signal to measure the influence of regressors and how this changed over time. Secondly, we look
at how the estimated coefficients have changed over the sample period.
Figure 3.6 portrays the influence each regressor has on the overall signal in each period. To
construct the series, we multiply each coefficient with the standard deviation of the corresponding
variable and compare the absolute value to that of other coefficients as a percentage share. A
number of observations are noteworthy. Firstly, the model saw a lot of change between 2006 and
2009, but has been remarkably stable since then. Growing steadily over the first years of the
sample, equity momentum has developed to become the dominating element of forecasts. At
the same time, carry lost some of its importance after 2009 and is roughly of equal importance
as the real exchange rate and economic surprises.
Figure 3.7 looks in more detail at the behaviour of individual coefficients. Each line in the
graph represents the product of a variable’s regression coefficient and the variable’s standard
deviation. Overall, the graph confirms the picture of broadly stable relationships, especially
after 2009. That said, a paradigm shift seems to take place when it comes to the influence
of equity momentum (long dashed line). Starting off with a significant negative coefficient,
i.e. representing a reversal element where strong equity performance is followed by negative
risk premia, the coefficient turns positive very suddenly in mid-2008, introducing the notion
of momentum in the place of reversal. All other coefficients have the sign that theory would
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Figure 3.4: Annualised mean excess returns (in %) by currency for rank portfolio strategy.
Figure 3.5: Annualised mean excess returns (in %) by currency for high-minus-low portfolio
strategy.
Figure 3.6: Influence of explanatory variables on overall forecast signal, constructed as the
absolute value of product of regression coefficient and standard deviation of the corresponding
variable.
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Figure 3.7: Influence of explanatory variables on overall forecast signal, constructed as the
product of a variable’s regression coefficient and standard deviation of the variable.
suggest: real exchange rate strength has a negative effect on risk premia, while it is positive for
carry and economic surprises.
Implied USD Exposure
By construction, all portfolio strategies presented above have a neutral position to the US dollar.
While the dollar serves as the hypothetical home currency against which all returns are measured,
we never enter either a long or a short position in USD. That said, it is well known that some
emerging market currencies have a higher correlation to the USD than others. This implies
that, in practice, our portfolios could have an indirect exposure to USD movements, whether
intended or not. In other words, the portfolio can profit from exposing itself to the USD by
opening positions in EM currencies that are themselves highly correlated with the dollar.
Examining this question further, we first calculate 12-month rolling correlations between
1-month nominal exchange rate changes and the 1-month return in the broad trade weighted
USD index. In a second step, we weight these correlations with the portfolio weights for each
currency and sum them up to create a measure of portfolio exposure to the dollar. Figure 3.8
shows this measure of dollar exposure for the linear, rank and high-minus-low portoflios. The
chart also shows the history of the USD index. As can be seen, the portfolios are indeed exposed
to the USD, at times profiting and at other times losing out from movements in the dollar. An
interesting avenue for future investigation would be to examine whether these exposures can be
systematically exploited to increase portfolio returns.
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Figure 3.8: Indirect portfolio exposure to USD index, calculated as the weighted sum of rolling
correlations between EM currency returns and USD index returns. We use Bloomberg’s DXY
Index for the USD, plotted on the right side of the chart.
Transaction Costs
Finally, an important question to ask is in how far transaction costs reduce realised out-of-sample
portfolio returns. We use data on bid-ask spreads available on Bloomberg and from BofA Merrill
Lynch (2014) to recalculate the statistics from Table 3.2, adjusting returns for transaction costs.
Average transaction costs across all currencies in the sample are 3.8 basis points,6 implying
that the monthly return to an investment of 1 unit of currency is reduced by approximately
0.038 percentage points. Note that these calculations can only serve as an approximation, as
transaction costs change over time. Moreover, the size of bid-ask spreads in practice depends
on the amount traded.
Table 3.7 presents the recalculated results, alongside the original numbers. As can be seen,
Sharpe Ratios fall by between 0.04 and 0.08, but remain large and significant.
More generally, every reduction in Sharpe Ratios naturally reduces the willingness of market
participants to engage in a certain strategy. As is the case with most proposed currency strate-
gies, significant returns might simply exist because the costs of arbitrage are too high. Whether
taking transaction costs into account or not, this possibility cannot be excluded ex ante.
6Each position requires payment of the complete bid-ask spread, as half has to be paid when entering a position
and the other half again when exiting a position.
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no transaction cost incl. transaction cost
portfolio linear rank HML linear rank HML
mean 5.05 3.60 7.39 4.57 3.13 6.91
t [2.76] [2.36] [1.96] [2.51] [2.05] [1.84]
ρ 6.59 5.73 13.05 6.59 5.73 13.05
Sharpe ratio 0.75 0.62 0.55 0.68 0.54 0.51
Table 3.7: This table shows results for out-of-sample tests of the three benchmark portfolios,
adjusted for transaction costs. Mean returns, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios are annu-
alised. T-statistics are calculated based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. The sample
includes monthly data from 2006M1 to 2016M12.
3.6 Conclusion
Bridging various strands of the existing literature on exchange rate forecasting, this paper has
proposed a novel approach to estimating currency risk premia. The analysis has produced three
main results.
Firstly, the paper has shown that combining a measure of currency value in the form of real
exchange rate strength with measures for market sentiment allows for the creation of powerful
forecasts over a short horizon. Whilst most currency forecasts focus on horizons of multiple
years and, at an extreme, manage to forecast currencies over one quarter, the model proposed
in this paper predicts excess returns over only one month. In doing so, we improve upon the
widely established result that excess returns cannot be consistently forecast for such a short
time horizon.
Secondly, the model outperforms a carry trading strategy both in terms of the size of returns,
as well as their consistency. By design, the portfolio approach from our benchmark model can
be replicated for a carry trading strategy, allowing results between carry and the benchmark
model to be directly compared. As the carry strategy in our model is by definition identical to a
random walk model, we thereby also beat the latter—widely considered to be the quintessential
benchmark in short term currency forecasting.
Thirdly, we show that results hold up to the inclusion of transaction costs. While returns are
smaller across the portfolio, they are still significant and economically large, allowing investors
to systematically generate positive excess returns in emerging market currencies.
All results have been established out of sample and further checks establish their robustness
across time periods, currencies included and explanatory variables.
Methodologically, the model takes a clear stance when it comes to arbitrary and heteroge-
neous models of currency forecasting. For one, the model only includes a limited number of
explanatory variables that are all identified by the existing literature as highly significant for
forecasting risk premia. Moreover, the model applies the same data and an identical structure
across all currencies in the sample, providing a generalised method that is independent of the
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chosen currency and time period. Using an OLS estimation technique furthermore allows a
straightforward decomposition and interpretation of forecasting signals, providing information
beyond the numerical output itself.
Forecasting currency returns remains an extremely difficult challenge, where results are of-
ten invalidated as the market learns to incorporate them. In this environment, progress in the
literature is often met with further increasing gaps, leaving a lot of room for improvement in our
understanding of underlying mechanisms. As currency forecasting will never be a hard science,
it remains tantamount that models not only produce a mechanical output, but also provide the
market observer with information as to the origin and composition of signals. In other words,
black boxes are to be avoided. This paper has taken a significant step in producing a model
that is general, yet simple enough to provide information far beyond each currency’s numerical
forecast and, in doing so, filled gaps in the literature between long-term and short-term fore-
casting, as well as between fundamental and behavioural forecasting. That said, a lot of work
remains to be done to better understand and predict exchange rate movements. Whilst further
theoretical contributions are needed that build models incorporating the empirical evidence,
the wider availability of data will make it possible to also further extend empirical analyses of
currencies. One direct extension to the paper will be an analysis of the proposed model for
developed market currencies. Another promising and highly relevant direction of research will
be to create better measures of market sentiment and uncertainty on a country by country level.
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